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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION
JOHN C.CALHOUN, }
}
Plaintiff, }
}
vs. } Case No. 6:04CV2455
}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND }
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE }
}
Defendant(s). }
______________________________________}
COMPLAINT TO OVERTURN INVALID IRS COLLECTION DUE PROCESS "DETERMINATION" LAWLESSLY ISSUED PURSUANT TO 26 USC 6330
COMES NOW, John C. Calhoun, Plaintiff in this action and invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Each "Determination" at issue (attached as Exhibits A1 and A2), was issued on July 8, 2004 and by employees of the Defendant, in response to Plaintiff’s request for a "Collection Due Process Hearing" (hereinafter: CDPH or CDP Hearing). Those determinations were issued in violation of law, as the following will show. 1) On May 26, 2002 Plaintiff requested the CDPH guaranteed to him in 26 USC 6320(b) & 6330(b) both of which Sections being captioned: "Right to fair hearing". (See Plaintiff’s request, attached as Exhibit B). This hearing was never granted. 2) Internal Revenue agent Mary Green (ID number 57-10049) had scheduled a "correspondence hearing" in Columbia, SC on June 9, 2004 (see Exhibit G). The "hearing" concerned whether or not the United States could legally seize Plaintiff’s property pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 6331 even though no court order, writ of garnishment or writ of attachment had ever been issued by any court of law with respect to any of Plaintiff’s property. The hearing would also be used as a means to discuss any proposed payment schedule or collection alternatives. Plaintiff requested that the hearing be changed to a face-to-face hearing in Greenville, South Carolina where he lives and where the IRS has an office (on Roper Mountain Road). The IRS holds CDP hearings at that location frequently. Plaintiff also requested that the hearing be postponed until such time that (1) documents regarding the Plaintiff and his case could be obtained from the disclosure office of the IRS under the Freedom of Information Act, which were requested on May 24, 2004 and promised by the IRS by July 30, 2004 (attached as Exhibit D), and (2) so that Plaintiff would have adequate time to consult proper counsel in the matter. These requests were ignored or summarily denied.
3) Plaintiff had previously requested a face-to-face hearing in San Luis Obispo, CA (where his family lives) in letters dated December 11, 2003 and December 22, 2003 (attached as Exhibits E and C). But this request was likewise ignored. 4) The "penalties," which the United States now seeks to extract by distraint, is not supported by any testimony nor does any documented evidence support it, as those terms are legally understood. 5) In letters of December 11, 2003 and December 22, 2003 (attached as Exhibits E and C), Plaintiff sent to the settlement officer a letter stating that he intended to make a tape recording of the meeting pursuant to code section 7521 and publication 17, as well as have a witnesses present. 6) Plaintiff has collection alternatives. He has a wife and minor children to support. Plaintiff owns no real estate and has no savings. At said hearing, Plaintiff would have had a right to set forth collection alternatives. However, the settlement officer would not hear it. The appeals officer violated Plaintiff’s rights. Therefore this case should be sent back to the IRS for a full and complete CDPH. 7) A "correspondence hearing" was allegedly held on June 9, 2004 in Columbia, SC. Plaintiff was not present, having made a timely request for postponement and change of venue as noted in item 2 above. There is no transcript of the hearing for that day, even though the events of that hearing are hotly contested. 8) Plaintiff was also denied his right under the law to make an audio recording of the meeting by virtue of the fact that a face-to-face hearing was summarily denied by the agent. Section 7521 states in relevant part, "Any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service in connection with any in-person interview with any taxpayer relating to the determination or collection of any tax shall, upon advance request (see Exhibits C and E) of such taxpayer, allow the taxpayer to make an audio recording of such interview…The Secretary of the Treasury cannot by his regulation alter or amend a Revenue Law" (Morrill vs. Jones 106 U.S. 466). Plaintiff’s CDP Hearing was held in violation of law and the determination should be set-aside on this basis alone. 9) In Keene v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. No. 2, July 8, 2003, The Tax Court said, "Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to section 7521(a)(1), petitioner is entitled to audio record his section 6330 hearing with the Appeals Office." 10) Congress enacted the hearing in question as a result of disclosures emanating from the Senate Finance Committee’s 1997 investigation of the Internal Revenue Service, which revealed widespread, lawless IRS seizures of property, and extensive violations by the IRS of taxpayers’ rights. [1] 11) Section 6330(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "No levy may be made on any property or right to property of any person unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing of their right to a hearing under this section before such levy is made." 12) Section 6330(c)(1) provides "The appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met." 13) Section 6330(c)(2) provides that "The person may raise at the hearing any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy…" 14) Section 6330(c)(2)(B) provides that "The person may also raise at the hearing challenges to the existence…of the underlying liability" if the person "did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability…" 15) Section 6330(c)(3) specifically states (in pertinent part) that the "determination by an appeals officer under this subsection shall take into consideration (A) the verification presented under paragraph (1)." 16) In accordance with such provisions of Section 6330, Plaintiff sent in a timely request for a CDP hearing as shown in Exhibits B, C, and E. 17) In a letter dated July 15, 2004 (attached as Exhibit F), Plaintiff asked that the appeals officer provide the following information, which has yet to be answered: a) An explanation why two different "Notice of Determination" letters were sent to Plaintiff with identical dates of July 8, 2004 (attached as Exhibits A1 and A2). Although the determinations of the IRS’s summary judgment were largely the same in both letters, one letter directs that "to dispute the determination in court" a petition must be filed in U.S. Tax Court, while the other letter directs that the petition must be filed in U.S. District Court, within 30 days. Why should Plaintiff have to file suit in two different court systems for the same case? Plaintiff believes that he has a right to choose which court in which to proceed and has thus proceeded to file suit in U.S. District Court to appeal both determinations. b) The document that supported the imposition of the penalty or the "signed" document as referred to in 26 USC 6751(b)) which would reveal the names of the Defendant’s employees who imposed the "frivolous" penalty and those who made a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments were "frivolous." c) The Federal ID numbers of the Defendant’s employees who imposed the "frivolous penalty" and those who made a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments were "frivolous." d) The Delegation Orders from the Secretary delegating to those persons who imposed the "frivolous penalty" their authority for doing so [2] and to make a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments are "frivolous." e) The official job description(s) of those IRS employees who imposed the "frivolous" penalty. (Footnote [2] was also applicable to this request) and of those who made a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments were "frivolous." f) Since Code Sections 6001 and 6011 (Code Sections to which the public is specifically directed to in the Privacy Act Notice of the 1040 booklet) advise the public that they need only "comply with regulations," Plaintiff requested that the appeals officer identify or produce the Treasury Department regulation that allows Defendant’s employees to impose the "frivolous" penalty, and the regulation that required Plaintiff to pay such a penalty, and the regulation that allows Defendant’s employee to make a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments are "frivolous." g) Plaintiff also notified Defendant that at the hearing he would challenge the "existence of the underlying liability" of the tax that generated the "frivolous penalty" as he was authorized to do by Code Section 6330(c)(2)(B) since Plaintiff did not receive any Deficiency Notice with respect to such a "tax liability". h) Plaintiff also requested that the appeals officer produce documented proof that the Secretary authorized the instant collection action and that the Attorney General or his delegate "directed" that this collection action be commenced as they are required to do pursuant to Code Sec. 7401. i) No provision in 26 USC 6330 provides that appeals officers can dictate conditions under which they will agree to conduct the CDP hearings required by law, or that allows them to dictate to taxpayers the issues they will consider at the hearings prior to the CDP hearings being held. 18) In his letters of December 11, 2003, December 22, 2003, and May 26, 2004 (see Exhibits E, C, and B), Plaintiff informed the appeals officer that he never received a valid Deficiency Notice that is one signed by the Secretary or someone with delegated authority from him. Moreover, since he never received a valid deficiency notice, Plaintiff would be "challenging the existence of the underlying tax liability" as Plaintiff is authorized to do in Code Section 6330(c)(2)(b). Plaintiff further informed the appeals officer that he never received the statutory "Notice and Demand" for payment in connection with the alleged taxes due. 19) Based on all of the above in item 18, Plaintiff asked the appeals officer for the following information in his letter dated July 15, 2004 (Exhibit F): a) The "verification from the Secretary that the requirement of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met" as required by 6330(c)(1). b) Since Plaintiff believed that "no valid assessment" for the income taxes allegedly due (to support the threatened levy action) was ever made, Plaintiff therefore wanted to see "a copy of the ‘Summary Record of Assessment’ (Form 23C) together with the ‘pertinent parts of the assessment etc. etc. etc….’ as provided for in Treas. Reg. 301.6203-1)" and a copy of the tax return from which the alleged assessment was made. c) Since all valid assessments must emanate from a filed return, proof that such a "filed return" exists is another "relevant" issue that Plaintiff had a right to raise. Therefore, Plaintiff requested that the appeals officer produce or identify the income tax return from which the alleged assessment for the income taxes at issue was made. d) Plaintiff asked for some documented proof that the statutory "Notice and Demand" for the payment of the income taxes allegedly due (as required by Code Sections 6303, 6321 and 6331) be provided. 20) Plaintiff has been exasperated by the refusal of IRS agents to answer written questions and concerns which they are legally obligated to answer. As a federal court ruled: "Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading...We cannot condone this shocking conduct by the IRS. Our revenue system is based upon the good faith of the taxpayers and the taxpayers should be able to expect the same from government in its enforcement and collection activities....This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is the ‘routine’ it should be corrected immediately" (U. S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 [1977], citing U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032). 21) Consequently, Plaintiff’s rights were violated and the notice of determination should be overturned and new collection Due Process hearing should be scheduled. Based on all the above, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court: 1) Declare invalid the IRS determinations of July 8, 2004, since no valid hearing was ever held. 2) Order the government to reimburse Plaintiff for all of (his) costs in bringing this action. Pursuant to 28 USC 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 23, 2004. Respectfully submitted,
___________________ John C. Calhoun, Ph.D., pro se P.O. Box 25 Greenville, SC 29616 ------------------------------------- [1] Based on those hearings, Senator William Roth who was then Chairman of the Committee, wrote a book entitled The Power to Destroy (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York City, 1999) which states on page 73, "The Internal Revenue Service itself admit that far too many of the countless assessments, seizures, levies, and liens that the IRS executes each year are inappropriate and in open violation of law." The first "bullet" on the book’s dust jacket states that the book reveals, "How the IRS …plays judge, jury, and executioner, depriving countless taxpayers of basic rights." Examples of such criminal IRS (or U.S. government) behavior are strewn liberally throughout the book. [2] In making such a request, Plaintiff was guided by the advice of the Supreme Court who warned in Federal Crop Insurance v. A.A. Merrill (332 U.S. 380) that those who "Enter into an arrangement with the government take a risk" if they do not "ascertain" that those who "purport" to "act for the government stay within the bounds of their authority" (citations omitted). In addition, Defendant’s Solicitor General argued in this case, "Those dealing with an officer or agent of the United States must be held to have had notice of the limitations upon his authority." Therefore, based on the Supreme Court’s warning, and the expectations of Defendant’s Solicitor General, the Defendant was duty bound to produce the Delegation Orders requested, but Defendant did not do so. |
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION
JOHN C.CALHOUN, }
}
Plaintiff, }
}
vs. } Case No. 6:04CV2455
}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND }
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE }
}
Defendant(s). }
______________________________________}
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS ENTERED BY
UNITED STATES
This case is a judicial appeal from the two notices of determination issued by the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter: IRS) office of appeals in Columbia, South Carolina on July 8, 2004. Under the “Collection Due Process Hearing” (hereinafter: CDPH or CDP Hearing) statute in Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter: IRC) 6330, Plaintiff John C. Calhoun has thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse determination of the IRS in U.S. District Court. Calhoun is asking the Court to force the IRS to grant him a CDPH as required by law. The United States filed a motion to dismiss this case on September 21, 2004. Calhoun hereby files his opposition to the motion to dismiss by the United States based on the following reasons: ARGUMENT AND REBUTTAL
1) For the years in question related to these two adverse determinations, 1991 and
1992, Calhoun was the father of four small dependent children and a
dependent wife who was a homemaker. Calhoun, who finished an M.A.
degree in 1987 at the age of 24, had only a short time earlier begun his
financial consulting practice (without completing the rest of his
formal graduate education), and had very low net income.2) The IRS claims that Calhoun owes over three hundred ten thousand dollars ($310,000) in taxes for the years 1991 and 1992. This figure is preposterous and a travesty. Calhoun had not had even close to that much income in his whole life up to that point, especially since he had been a full time student from 1969 to 1987, and afterwards only had entry-level employment in community colleges and financial consulting. Calhoun requests that the Court rectify this vast injustice. Calhoun further requests that the Court compel the IRS to provide evidence of how it can continue to try to pursue such old civil claims and maintain liens that have expired by the statute of limitations. 3) In 1991 and 1992, Calhoun filed the tax returns that he believed were correct and appropriate, and these returns indicated that Calhoun had no taxable income (especially due to his meager income with so many dependents). Calhoun further corresponded with the IRS on many occasions from 1991 to 1994 to ensure that his understanding of the statutes was correct. The IRS either did not respond at that time or sent stall or off-putting letters in reply. Calhoun still has these letters. In July 2004, Calhoun petitioned the IRS under the Freedom of Information Act to provide him with his tax returns for 1991 and 1992 as well as any calculation of tax liability for those years. On September 8, 2004, the IRS Atlanta disclosure office replied that they could not find or secure any tax returns for 1991 and 1992 (Exhibit A). Thus, the IRS has admitted losing the tax returns Calhoun carefully prepared and filed timely. 4) Nevertheless, because of Dr. Calhoun’s strong political position against socialism and IRS injustices, the IRS vindictively retaliated against Calhoun by inventing a baseless, grossly fictitious tax liability for such an outrageous amount. In addition to his seminal papers at that time, Dr. Calhoun is the author of many books and papers and is also a regular columnist and hosts a radio talk show that deals with public policy themes. Notwithstanding the IRS’s hatred of Dr. Calhoun’s views, the tax law is not intended to be used by the IRS to punish Calhoun for his strongly-held political views but rather for the IRS to collect the proper taxes. Yet the IRS has chosen to punish Dr. Calhoun as he has developed into a more outspoken advocate of free markets, a supporter of constitutionally limited government and low taxes, and a sophisticated public policy theorist. And the timing of this IRS attack is telling. The IRS basically ignored Dr. Calhoun’s correspondence during the first half of the 1990s, and then curiously did not attempt to contact Calhoun whatsoever for nearly a decade (until the end of 2003), just when Dr. Calhoun’s academic work was maturing. Dr. Calhoun has now become a noted author and scholar with regard to free market economics and policy, as well as the relationship between economics and the legal system. That is why he writes regular columns and hosts radio talk shows. Even though Dr. Calhoun has responded to the recent IRS attacks, the IRS continues to run roughshod over Dr. Calhoun’s correspondence, ignoring his questions and appeals, and behaving in a malevolent manner. 5) The government says that the case should be dismissed because the clerk of court (who refused to carry out his sworn duties) did not sign the summons as required by rule 4 of the Court’s rules of civil procedure. Calhoun could not wait until the clerk decided to sign the summons since he was bound to appeal the two “adverse determination” letters of the IRS appeals office within thirty (30) days. Calhoun asked the clerk’s office to sign but they refused, citing that the local rule was to not sign pro se case summons until a judge had reviewed the case. Calhoun doubted that this information was correct and contacted the main branch of the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina in Columbia, first by phone and then by letter to Mr. Larry Propes on August 5, 2004 (Exhibit B). As a result, Calhoun received a copy of Procedure Bulletin 98-5 (Rev. 12/31/03), attached as Exhibit C, which states the clerk’s authority for not signing the summons in a pro se case. While Calhoun agrees with the U.S. Attorney that the summons must be signed by the court according to rule 4, he had no choice but to serve unsigned summons because of the clerk’s refusal to sign the summons and because Calhoun had to serve the summons within thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse determinations. Calhoun was caught between the conflicting requirements of two bureaucracies. Calhoun had to immediately serve process in order to comply with the thirty (30) day requirement to appeal. The clerk, not Calhoun, caused the problem pointed out by the U.S. Attorney in the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Attorney claims that the summons was void since it was not signed and was served without being signed and sealed by the clerk of the court. While Calhoun agrees that a rule technicality was violated, he obviously could not help it and could do nothing about it. The internal memorandum that states the local rule prohibiting the clerk to sign pro se cases is discriminatory. It allows those who can afford expensive attorneys to avoid such restrictions and thus not run into such bureaucratic conflicts. It also discriminates against people like Calhoun who are able to defend themselves in minor administrative matters such as the one in this case. Dr. Calhoun’s doctoral studies in public policy involved a lot of legal studies, research, and some law courses. The law should be fair rather than unjustly discriminating against those who cannot afford expensive attorney fees or against those who are capable of self-representation. 6) With these conflicting rules, the government created a procedural problem and now it is seeking to punish Calhoun and deny his access to the courts. The U.S. Attorney’s arguments regarding this rule violation are patently frivolous and thus his motion should be flung out of court. Calhoun requests that frivolous (rule 11) penalties be applied to the U.S. Attorney’s office. 7) The government wants this case dismissed since Calhoun did not serve the U.S. Attorney properly, by giving the summons to a proper representative. But on July 23, 2004, the same day that the case was filed, both Calhoun and his process server, a local medical doctor, placed the summons directly into the hands of George Conits, the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Greenville, South Carolina. So the government’s argument is preposterous. The civil process clerk, if one exists, must have been behind bulletproof glass and not accessible to accept service. Besides, rule 4 does not specify that any one in particular must be served at the U.S. Attorney’s office, just that the U.S. Attorney must be served. 8) Bringing up this issue of incorrect service is an insult to the court, demeaning the process of justice. Mr. Conits is using the overwhelming resources of the federal government against a relatively impoverished and formally untrained (non-J.D.) pro se litigant. For this reason, the court should disregard the government’s motion and the U.S. Attorney should be admonished. 9) The U.S. Attorney also claims that Calhoun did not serve the Attorney General of the United States but this claim is not true. Per the return of serve claims filed in this court (Exhibit D), anyone can see that the Attorney General was served. The U.S. Postal “green card” for certified mail has been returned from the Attorney General’s office, even if the U.S. Attorney did not know it. Calhoun has one hundred and twenty (120) days to file the proof of service forms with the Court. Again, Calhoun requests that the court punish the U.S. Attorney for making such a frivolous argument. 10) Calhoun disagrees with the U.S. Attorney’s claim that this court has no jurisdiction in the case. Congress has set the U.S. District Court as the proper venue to hear procedural and administrative matters regarding plaintiffs like Calhoun who are dealing with the IRS. The IRS appeals office issued two adverse determinations on July 8, 2004. The first one was related to form 1040 for years 1991 and 1992 and any appeal was to be directed to U.S. Tax Court. The second one, with language essentially identical to the first, was related to form 6702 and any appeal was to be directed to U.S. District Court. (The U.S. Attorney apparently did not carefully read the second one since he believes that the Tax Court is the only proper venue.) Here again the IRS is being abusive and wasteful in trying to make Calhoun pursue identical cases in two different courts. Because this matter is procedural, Calhoun chose to file both cases in U.S. District Court. Calhoun is not merely appealing the IRS’s adverse determination, which could become a U.S. Tax Court issue, but also the nefarious behavior of the IRS in denying his procedural right to a face-to-face hearing. Issues regarding such procedure are the legitimate and proper subject of the U.S. District Court. The Court has jurisdiction because Calhoun is appealing a procedural matter of his right to a CDPH per IRC 6330. The IRS has a history of running roughshod over citizens’ procedural rights and Calhoun appeals to the judges under IRC 6330 for an independent judicial review. Such a review is most likely to be found in U.S. District Court rather than U.S. Tax Court. 11) The government also claims that Calhoun did not propose a viable collection alternative proposal or submit a “Collection Information Statement”. Here the IRS is making up requirements that were not mandated by Congress, so once again Calhoun deems it necessary to appeal to the independent judiciary. The fact is that Calhoun did request collection alternatives on the application for his CDPH and in his other related correspondence the term CDPH was used several times. IRC 6330 does not say that tax returns for all years have to be filed in order to get a CDPH. The fact is that Calhoun was not required to file tax returns for the years mentioned by the IRS appeals office or the U.S. Attorney, most of which coincided with Calhoun being a full time student or Calhoun living overseas for many years. The IRS does not seem to think that Calhoun has any filing requirement or tax liability either, for any of the years mentioned, since it has never pursued Calhoun for alleged taxes owed for any years other than 1991 and 1992. Furthermore, there are no pre-conditions other than requesting the CDPH within the specified time period, which Calhoun did. The IRS is simply disobeying the law. 12) Congress in IRS 6330 says that Calhoun is entitled to a CDPH, but he did not get one. Instead, the IRS unlawfully scheduled something called a “correspondence hearing”. Congress meant the CDPH would be a face-to-face meeting. The IRS is viciously denying Calhoun his rights. CONCLUSION
The IRS is trying to
thwart the will and intention of elected officials and the will of the
people. The bureaucracy has usurped the statutory words of Congress
(the expression of the will of the people) in denying Calhoun a CDPH.
The IRS is willfully ignoring, denying, and thwarting the law,
stonewalling and throwing up imaginary roadblocks to Dr. Calhoun’s
judicial remedy. Therefore, Dr. Calhoun appeals to the independent
judiciary for relief from these over-zealous bureaucrats by (A) forcing
the IRS to grant Dr. Calhoun his CDPH, (B) throwing out the motion to
dismiss entered by the U.S. Attorney, (C) allowing this proceeding to
continue in U.S. District Court rather than U.S. Tax Court, (D)
compelling the IRS and U.S. Attorney to provide proof of how they can
pursue actions on old, doubtful liens that have expired under the
statue of limitations, and (E) admonishing the U.S. Attorney for his
frivolous claims.Certificate of Service: I do hereby certify that on this date I sent properly a copy of this pleading to opposing counsel. Executed on October 4, 2004. Respectfully submitted, ___________________ John C. Calhoun, Ph.D., pro se P.O. Box 25 Greenville, SC 29616 |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |