Calhoun Cases

Table of Contents

  1. Dr. Calhoun's CDPH lawsuit in Federal Court
  2. Dr. Calhoun's Opposition to IRS Motion to Dismiss
  3. Dr. Calhoun's Brief in Support to Opposition to IRS Motion to Dismiss
  4. Dr. Calhoun's Reply To Answer Entered By United States
  5. Dr. Calhoun's Response to Reply Brief Entered by U.S.
  6. Dr. Calhoun's Reply and Rebuttal to Motions
  7. Dr. Calhoun's Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories
  8. Dr. Calhoun's Complaint to Overturn Invalid IRS Collection Due Process Determination
  9. Dr. Calhoun's Notice of Appeal to 4th Circuit Court
  10. Dr. Calhoun's Motion for Extension of Time
  11. Dr. Calhoun's Famous Appeals Brief on Schulz II
  12. Dr. Calhoun's Reply to Memorandum Brief of Appellees
  13. Dr. Calhoun's Motion for Rehearing

Dr. Calhoun's CDPH lawsuit in Federal Court

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

JOHN C.CALHOUN,                       }
                                      }
Plaintiff,                            }
                                      }
vs.                                   } Case No. 6:04CV2455
                                      }
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND          }
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER         }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE                   }
                                      }
Defendant(s).                         }
______________________________________}
COMPLAINT TO OVERTURN INVALID IRS COLLECTION DUE PROCESS "DETERMINATION" LAWLESSLY ISSUED PURSUANT TO 26 USC 6330

COMES NOW, John C. Calhoun, Plaintiff in this action and invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to
26 USC 6330(d)(1)(A) to set aside two determinations at issue.

Each "Determination" at issue (attached as Exhibits A1 and A2), was issued on July 8, 2004 and by employees of the Defendant, in response to Plaintiff’s request for a "Collection Due Process Hearing" (hereinafter: CDPH or CDP Hearing). Those determinations were issued in violation of law, as the following will show.

1) On May 26, 2002 Plaintiff requested the CDPH guaranteed to him in 26 USC 6320(b) & 6330(b) both of which Sections being captioned: "Right to fair hearing". (See Plaintiff’s request, attached as Exhibit B). This hearing was never granted.

2) Internal Revenue agent Mary Green (ID number 57-10049) had scheduled a "correspondence hearing" in Columbia, SC on June 9, 2004 (see Exhibit G). The "hearing" concerned whether or not the United States could legally seize Plaintiff’s property pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 6331 even though no court order, writ of garnishment or writ of attachment had ever been issued by any court of law with respect to any of Plaintiff’s property. The hearing would also be used as a means to discuss any proposed payment schedule or collection alternatives. Plaintiff requested that the hearing be changed to a face-to-face hearing in Greenville, South Carolina where he lives and where the IRS has an office (on Roper Mountain Road). The IRS holds CDP hearings at that location frequently. Plaintiff also requested that the hearing be postponed until such time that (1) documents regarding the Plaintiff and his case could be obtained from the disclosure office of the IRS under the Freedom of Information Act, which were requested on May 24, 2004 and promised by the IRS by July 30, 2004 (attached as Exhibit D), and (2) so that Plaintiff would have adequate time to consult proper counsel in the matter. These requests were ignored or summarily denied.

3) Plaintiff had previously requested a face-to-face hearing in San Luis Obispo, CA (where his family lives) in letters dated December 11, 2003 and December 22, 2003 (attached as Exhibits E and C). But this request was likewise ignored.

4) The "penalties," which the United States now seeks to extract by distraint, is not supported by any testimony nor does any documented evidence support it, as those terms are legally understood.

5) In letters of December 11, 2003 and December 22, 2003 (attached as Exhibits E and C), Plaintiff sent to the settlement officer a letter stating that he intended to make a tape recording of the meeting pursuant to code section 7521 and publication 17, as well as have a witnesses present.

6) Plaintiff has collection alternatives. He has a wife and minor children to support. Plaintiff owns no real estate and has no savings. At said hearing, Plaintiff would have had a right to set forth collection alternatives. However, the settlement officer would not hear it. The appeals officer violated Plaintiff’s rights. Therefore this case should be sent back to the IRS for a full and complete CDPH.

7) A "correspondence hearing" was allegedly held on June 9, 2004 in Columbia, SC. Plaintiff was not present, having made a timely request for postponement and change of venue as noted in item 2 above. There is no transcript of the hearing for that day, even though the events of that hearing are hotly contested.

8) Plaintiff was also denied his right under the law to make an audio recording of the meeting by virtue of the fact that a face-to-face hearing was summarily denied by the agent. Section 7521 states in relevant part, "Any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service in connection with any in-person interview with any taxpayer relating to the determination or collection of any tax shall, upon advance request (see Exhibits C and E) of such taxpayer, allow the taxpayer to make an audio recording of such interview…The Secretary of the Treasury cannot by his regulation alter or amend a Revenue Law" (Morrill vs. Jones 106 U.S. 466). Plaintiff’s CDP Hearing was held in violation of law and the determination should be set-aside on this basis alone.

9) In Keene v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. No. 2, July 8, 2003, The Tax Court said, "Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to section 7521(a)(1), petitioner is entitled to audio record his section 6330 hearing with the Appeals Office."

10) Congress enacted the hearing in question as a result of disclosures emanating from the Senate Finance Committee’s 1997 investigation of the Internal Revenue Service, which revealed widespread, lawless IRS seizures of property, and extensive violations by the IRS of taxpayers’ rights. [1]

11) Section 6330(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "No levy may be made on any property or right to property of any person unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing of their right to a hearing under this section before such levy is made."

12) Section 6330(c)(1) provides "The appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met."

13) Section 6330(c)(2) provides that "The person may raise at the hearing any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy…"

14) Section 6330(c)(2)(B) provides that "The person may also raise at the hearing challenges to the existence…of the underlying liability" if the person "did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability…"

15) Section 6330(c)(3) specifically states (in pertinent part) that the "determination by an appeals officer under this subsection shall take into consideration (A) the verification presented under paragraph (1)."

16) In accordance with such provisions of Section 6330, Plaintiff sent in a timely request for a CDP hearing as shown in Exhibits B, C, and E.

17) In a letter dated July 15, 2004 (attached as Exhibit F), Plaintiff asked that the appeals officer provide the following information, which has yet to be answered:

a) An explanation why two different "Notice of Determination" letters were sent to Plaintiff with identical dates of July 8, 2004 (attached as Exhibits A1 and A2). Although the determinations of the IRS’s summary judgment were largely the same in both letters, one letter directs that "to dispute the determination in court" a petition must be filed in U.S. Tax Court, while the other letter directs that the petition must be filed in U.S. District Court, within 30 days. Why should Plaintiff have to file suit in two different court systems for the same case? Plaintiff believes that he has a right to choose which court in which to proceed and has thus proceeded to file suit in U.S. District Court to appeal both determinations.

b) The document that supported the imposition of the penalty or the "signed" document as referred to in 26 USC 6751(b)) which would reveal the names of the Defendant’s employees who imposed the "frivolous" penalty and those who made a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments were "frivolous."

c) The Federal ID numbers of the Defendant’s employees who imposed the "frivolous penalty" and those who made a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments were "frivolous."

d) The Delegation Orders from the Secretary delegating to those persons who imposed the "frivolous penalty" their authority for doing so [2] and to make a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments are "frivolous."

e) The official job description(s) of those IRS employees who imposed the "frivolous" penalty. (Footnote [2] was also applicable to this request) and of those who made a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments were "frivolous."

f) Since Code Sections 6001 and 6011 (Code Sections to which the public is specifically directed to in the Privacy Act Notice of the 1040 booklet) advise the public that they need only "comply with regulations," Plaintiff requested that the appeals officer identify or produce the Treasury Department regulation that allows Defendant’s employees to impose the "frivolous" penalty, and the regulation that required Plaintiff to pay such a penalty, and the regulation that allows Defendant’s employee to make a determination that Plaintiff’s arguments are "frivolous."

g) Plaintiff also notified Defendant that at the hearing he would challenge the "existence of the underlying liability" of the tax that generated the "frivolous penalty" as he was authorized to do by Code Section 6330(c)(2)(B) since Plaintiff did not receive any Deficiency Notice with respect to such a "tax liability".

h) Plaintiff also requested that the appeals officer produce documented proof that the Secretary authorized the instant collection action and that the Attorney General or his delegate "directed" that this collection action be commenced as they are required to do pursuant to Code Sec. 7401.

i) No provision in 26 USC 6330 provides that appeals officers can dictate conditions under which they will agree to conduct the CDP hearings required by law, or that allows them to dictate to taxpayers the issues they will consider at the hearings prior to the CDP hearings being held.

18) In his letters of December 11, 2003, December 22, 2003, and May 26, 2004 (see Exhibits E, C, and B), Plaintiff informed the appeals officer that he never received a valid Deficiency Notice that is one signed by the Secretary or someone with delegated authority from him. Moreover, since he never received a valid deficiency notice, Plaintiff would be "challenging the existence of the underlying tax liability" as Plaintiff is authorized to do in Code Section 6330(c)(2)(b). Plaintiff further informed the appeals officer that he never received the statutory "Notice and Demand" for payment in connection with the alleged taxes due.

19) Based on all of the above in item 18, Plaintiff asked the appeals officer for the following information in his letter dated July 15, 2004 (Exhibit F):

a) The "verification from the Secretary that the requirement of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met" as required by 6330(c)(1).

b) Since Plaintiff believed that "no valid assessment" for the income taxes allegedly due (to support the threatened levy action) was ever made, Plaintiff therefore wanted to see "a copy of the ‘Summary Record of Assessment’ (Form 23C) together with the ‘pertinent parts of the assessment etc. etc. etc….’ as provided for in Treas. Reg. 301.6203-1)" and a copy of the tax return from which the alleged assessment was made.

c) Since all valid assessments must emanate from a filed return, proof that such a "filed return" exists is another "relevant" issue that Plaintiff had a right to raise. Therefore, Plaintiff requested that the appeals officer produce or identify the income tax return from which the alleged assessment for the income taxes at issue was made.

d) Plaintiff asked for some documented proof that the statutory "Notice and Demand" for the payment of the income taxes allegedly due (as required by Code Sections 6303, 6321 and 6331) be provided.

20) Plaintiff has been exasperated by the refusal of IRS agents to answer written questions and concerns which they are legally obligated to answer. As a federal court ruled: "Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading...We cannot condone this shocking conduct by the IRS. Our revenue system is based upon the good faith of the taxpayers and the taxpayers should be able to expect the same from government in its enforcement and collection activities....This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is the ‘routine’ it should be corrected immediately" (U. S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 [1977], citing U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032).

21) Consequently, Plaintiff’s rights were violated and the notice of determination should be overturned and new collection Due Process hearing should be scheduled. Based on all the above, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court:

1) Declare invalid the IRS determinations of July 8, 2004, since no valid hearing was ever held.

2) Order the government to reimburse Plaintiff for all of (his) costs in bringing this action.

Pursuant to 28 USC 1746, I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 23, 2004.

Respectfully submitted,

___________________

John C. Calhoun, Ph.D., pro se

P.O. Box 25

Greenville, SC 29616

-------------------------------------

[1] Based on those hearings, Senator William Roth who was then Chairman of the Committee, wrote a book entitled The Power to Destroy (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York City, 1999) which states on page 73, "The Internal Revenue Service itself admit that far too many of the countless assessments, seizures, levies, and liens that the IRS executes each year are inappropriate and in open violation of law." The first "bullet" on the book’s dust jacket states that the book reveals, "How the IRS …plays judge, jury, and executioner, depriving countless taxpayers of basic rights." Examples of such criminal IRS (or U.S. government) behavior are strewn liberally throughout the book.

[2] In making such a request, Plaintiff was guided by the advice of the Supreme Court who warned in Federal Crop Insurance v. A.A. Merrill (332 U.S. 380) that those who "Enter into an arrangement with the government take a risk" if they do not "ascertain" that those who "purport" to "act for the government stay within the bounds of their authority" (citations omitted). In addition, Defendant’s Solicitor General argued in this case, "Those dealing with an officer or agent of the United States must be held to have had notice of the limitations upon his authority." Therefore, based on the Supreme Court’s warning, and the expectations of Defendant’s Solicitor General, the Defendant was duty bound to produce the Delegation Orders requested, but Defendant did not do so.

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Dr. Calhoun's Opposition to IRS Motion to Dismiss

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

JOHN C.CALHOUN,                       }
                                      }
Plaintiff,                            }
                                      }
vs.                                   } Case No. 6:04CV2455
                                      }
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND          }
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER         }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE                   }
                                      }
Defendant(s).                         }
______________________________________}
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS ENTERED BY UNITED STATES
 
This case is a judicial appeal from the two notices of determination issued by the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter: IRS) office of appeals in Columbia, South Carolina on July 8, 2004.  Under the “Collection Due Process Hearing” (hereinafter: CDPH or CDP Hearing) statute in Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter: IRC) 6330, Plaintiff John C. Calhoun has thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse determination of the IRS in U.S. District Court.  Calhoun is asking the Court to force the IRS to grant him a CDPH as required by law.  The United States filed a motion to dismiss this case on September 21, 2004.  Calhoun hereby files his opposition to the motion to dismiss by the United States based on the following reasons: 
ARGUMENT AND REBUTTAL
1) For the years in question related to these two adverse determinations, 1991 and 1992, Calhoun was the father of four small dependent children and a dependent wife who was a homemaker.  Calhoun, who finished an M.A. degree in 1987 at the age of 24, had only a short time earlier begun his financial consulting practice (without completing the rest of his formal graduate education), and had very low net income.
 
2) The IRS claims that Calhoun owes over three hundred ten thousand dollars ($310,000) in taxes for the years 1991 and 1992.  This figure is preposterous and a travesty.  Calhoun had not had even close to that much income in his whole life up to that point, especially since he had been a full time student from 1969 to 1987, and afterwards only had entry-level employment in community colleges and financial consulting.  Calhoun requests that the Court rectify this vast injustice.  Calhoun further requests that the Court compel the IRS to provide evidence of how it can continue to try to pursue such old civil claims and maintain liens that have expired by the statute of limitations.
 
3) In 1991 and 1992, Calhoun filed the tax returns that he believed were correct and appropriate, and these returns indicated that Calhoun had no taxable income (especially due to his meager income with so many dependents).  Calhoun further corresponded with the IRS on many occasions from 1991 to 1994 to ensure that his understanding of the statutes was correct.  The IRS either did not respond at that time or sent stall or off-putting letters in reply.  Calhoun still has these letters.  In July 2004, Calhoun petitioned the IRS under the Freedom of Information Act to provide him with his tax returns for 1991 and 1992 as well as any calculation of tax liability for those years.  On September 8, 2004, the IRS Atlanta disclosure office replied that they could not find or secure any tax returns for 1991 and 1992 (Exhibit A).  Thus, the IRS has admitted losing the tax returns Calhoun carefully prepared and filed timely.
 
4) Nevertheless, because of Dr. Calhoun’s strong political position against socialism and IRS injustices, the IRS vindictively retaliated against Calhoun by inventing a baseless, grossly fictitious tax liability for such an outrageous amount.  In addition to his seminal papers at that time, Dr. Calhoun is the author of many books and papers and is also a regular columnist and hosts a radio talk show that deals with public policy themes.
Notwithstanding the IRS’s hatred of Dr. Calhoun’s views, the tax law is not intended to be used by the IRS to punish Calhoun for his strongly-held political views but rather for the IRS to collect the proper taxes.  Yet the IRS has chosen to punish Dr. Calhoun as he has developed into a more outspoken advocate of free markets, a supporter of constitutionally limited government and low taxes, and a sophisticated public policy theorist.  And the timing of this IRS attack is telling. 
The IRS basically ignored Dr. Calhoun’s correspondence during the first half of the 1990s, and then curiously did not attempt to contact Calhoun whatsoever for nearly a decade (until the end of 2003), just when Dr. Calhoun’s academic work was maturing.  Dr. Calhoun has now become a noted author and scholar with regard to free market economics and policy, as well as the relationship between economics and the legal system.  That is why he writes regular columns and hosts radio talk shows.  Even though Dr. Calhoun has responded to the recent IRS attacks, the IRS continues to run roughshod over Dr. Calhoun’s correspondence, ignoring his questions and appeals, and behaving in a malevolent manner.
 
5) The government says that the case should be dismissed because the clerk of court (who refused to carry out his sworn duties) did not sign the summons as required by rule 4 of the Court’s rules of civil procedure. 
Calhoun could not wait until the clerk decided to sign the summons since he was bound to appeal the two “adverse determination” letters of the IRS appeals office within thirty (30) days.  Calhoun asked the clerk’s office to sign but they refused, citing that the local rule was to not sign pro se case summons until a judge had reviewed the case. 

Calhoun doubted that this information was correct and contacted the main branch of the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina in Columbia, first by phone and then by letter to Mr. Larry Propes on August 5, 2004 (Exhibit B).  As a result, Calhoun received a copy of Procedure Bulletin 98-5 (Rev. 12/31/03), attached as Exhibit C, which states the clerk’s authority for not signing the summons in a pro se case.

While Calhoun agrees with the U.S. Attorney that the summons must be signed by the court according to rule 4, he had no choice but to serve unsigned summons because of the clerk’s refusal to sign the summons and because Calhoun had to serve the summons within thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse determinations.  Calhoun was caught between the conflicting requirements of two bureaucracies.  Calhoun had to immediately serve process in order to comply with the thirty (30) day requirement to appeal. 

The clerk, not Calhoun, caused the problem pointed out by the U.S. Attorney in the motion to dismiss.  The U.S. Attorney claims that the summons was void since it was not signed and was served without being signed and sealed by the clerk of the court.  While Calhoun agrees that a rule technicality was violated, he obviously could not help it and could do nothing about it. 

The internal memorandum that states the local rule prohibiting the clerk to sign pro se cases is discriminatory.  It allows those who can afford expensive attorneys to avoid such restrictions and thus not run into such bureaucratic conflicts.  It also discriminates against people like Calhoun who are able to defend themselves in minor administrative matters such as the one in this case.  Dr. Calhoun’s doctoral studies in public policy involved a lot of legal studies, research, and some law courses.  The law should be fair rather than unjustly discriminating against those who cannot afford expensive attorney fees or against those who are capable of self-representation.
 
6) With these conflicting rules, the government created a procedural problem and now it is seeking to punish Calhoun and deny his access to the courts.  The U.S. Attorney’s arguments regarding this rule violation are patently frivolous and thus his motion should be flung out of court.  Calhoun requests that frivolous (rule 11) penalties be applied to the U.S. Attorney’s office.
 
7) The government wants this case dismissed since Calhoun did not serve the U.S. Attorney properly, by giving the summons to a proper representative.  But on July 23, 2004, the same day that the case was filed, both Calhoun and his process server, a local medical doctor, placed the summons directly into the hands of George Conits, the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Greenville, South Carolina.  So the government’s argument is preposterous.  The civil process clerk, if one exists, must have been behind bulletproof glass and not accessible to accept service.  Besides, rule 4 does not specify that any one in particular must be served at the U.S. Attorney’s office, just that the U.S. Attorney must be served.
 
8) Bringing up this issue of incorrect service is an insult to the court, demeaning the process of justice.  Mr. Conits is using the overwhelming resources of the federal government against a relatively impoverished and formally untrained (non-J.D.) pro se litigant.  For this reason, the court should disregard the government’s motion and the U.S. Attorney should be admonished.
 
9) The U.S. Attorney also claims that Calhoun did not serve the Attorney General of the United States but this claim is not true.  Per the return of serve claims filed in this court (Exhibit D), anyone can see that the Attorney General was served.  The U.S. Postal “green card” for certified mail has been returned from the Attorney General’s office, even if the U.S. Attorney did not know it.  Calhoun has one hundred and twenty (120) days to file the proof of service forms with the Court.  Again, Calhoun requests that the court punish the U.S. Attorney for making such a frivolous argument.
 
10) Calhoun disagrees with the U.S. Attorney’s claim that this court has no jurisdiction in the case.  Congress has set the U.S. District Court as the proper venue to hear procedural and administrative matters regarding plaintiffs like Calhoun who are dealing with the IRS.  
The IRS appeals office issued two adverse determinations on July 8, 2004.  The first one was related to form 1040 for years 1991 and 1992 and any appeal was to be directed to U.S. Tax Court.  The second one, with language essentially identical to the first, was related to form 6702 and any appeal was to be directed to U.S. District Court.  (The U.S. Attorney apparently did not carefully read the second one since he believes that the Tax Court is the only proper venue.) 
Here again the IRS is being abusive and wasteful in trying to make Calhoun pursue identical cases in two different courts.  Because this matter is procedural, Calhoun chose to file both cases in U.S. District Court.  Calhoun is not merely appealing the IRS’s adverse determination, which could become a U.S. Tax Court issue, but also the nefarious behavior of the IRS in denying his procedural right to a face-to-face hearing.  Issues regarding such procedure are the legitimate and proper subject of the U.S. District Court. 
The Court has jurisdiction because Calhoun is appealing a procedural matter of his right to a CDPH per IRC 6330.  The IRS has a history of running roughshod over citizens’ procedural rights and Calhoun appeals to the judges under IRC 6330 for an independent judicial review.  Such a review is most likely to be found in U.S. District Court rather than U.S. Tax Court.
 
11) The government also claims that Calhoun did not propose a viable collection alternative proposal or submit a “Collection Information Statement”.  Here the IRS is making up requirements that were not mandated by Congress, so once again Calhoun deems it necessary to appeal to the independent judiciary.  The fact is that Calhoun did request collection alternatives on the application for his CDPH and in his other related correspondence the term CDPH was used several times. 
IRC 6330 does not say that tax returns for all years have to be filed in order to get a CDPH.  The fact is that Calhoun was not required to file tax returns for the years mentioned by the IRS appeals office or the U.S. Attorney, most of which coincided with Calhoun being a full time student or Calhoun living overseas for many years.  The IRS does not seem to think that Calhoun has any filing requirement or tax liability either, for any of the years mentioned, since it has never pursued Calhoun for alleged taxes owed for any years other than 1991 and 1992.  Furthermore, there are no pre-conditions other than requesting the CDPH within the specified time period, which Calhoun did.  The IRS is simply disobeying the law.
 
12) Congress in IRS 6330 says that Calhoun is entitled to a CDPH, but he did not get one.  Instead, the IRS unlawfully scheduled something called a “correspondence hearing”.  Congress meant the CDPH would be a face-to-face meeting.  The IRS is viciously denying Calhoun his rights.
CONCLUSION
The IRS is trying to thwart the will and intention of elected officials and the will of the people.  The bureaucracy has usurped the statutory words of Congress (the expression of the will of the people) in denying Calhoun a CDPH.  The IRS is willfully ignoring, denying, and thwarting the law, stonewalling and throwing up imaginary roadblocks to Dr. Calhoun’s judicial remedy.  Therefore, Dr. Calhoun appeals to the independent judiciary for relief from these over-zealous bureaucrats by (A) forcing the IRS to grant Dr. Calhoun his CDPH, (B) throwing out the motion to dismiss entered by the U.S. Attorney, (C) allowing this proceeding to continue in U.S. District Court rather than U.S. Tax Court, (D) compelling the IRS and U.S. Attorney to provide proof of how they can pursue actions on old, doubtful liens that have expired under the statue of limitations, and (E) admonishing the U.S. Attorney for his frivolous claims.

Certificate of Service: I do hereby certify that on this date I sent properly a copy of this pleading to opposing counsel.

Executed on October 4, 2004.

Respectfully submitted,


 
___________________
John C. Calhoun, Ph.D., pro se

P.O. Box 25
Greenville, SC 29616

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Dr. Calhoun's Brief in Support of Opposition to IRS Motion to Dismiss

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

JOHN C.CALHOUN,                       }
                                      }
Plaintiff,                            }
                                      }
vs.                                   } Case No. 6:04CV2455
                                      }
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND          }
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER         }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE                   }
                                      }
Defendant(s).                         }
______________________________________}
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS ENTERED BY UNITED STATES

This case is a judicial appeal from the two notices of determination issued by the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter: IRS) office of appeals in Columbia, South Carolina on July 8, 2004.  Under the “Collection Due Process Hearing” (hereinafter: CDPH or CDP Hearing) statute in Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter: IRC) 6330, Plaintiff John C. Calhoun has thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse determination of the IRS in U.S. District Court.  Calhoun is asking the Court to force the IRS to grant him a CDPH as required by law.  The United States filed a motion to dismiss this case on September 21, 2004.  Calhoun has filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss by the United States, and further files his opposition to the reply of the United States in support of that motion of October 12, 2004 based on the following reasons:

ARGUMENT AND REBUTTAL
1)  According to 26 USC 6330(d)(1)(B)(d), regarding the judicial review of an adverse determination, the statute provides, “The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, appeal such determination­(A) to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter); or (B) if the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction of the underlying tax liability, to a district court of the United States.  If a court determines that the appeal was to an incorrect court, a person shall have 30 days after the court determination to file such appeal with the correct court.”  Therefore, since the “underlying tax liability” is in question, and has been raised as an issue with the IRS, as well as the complaint and motion to dismiss submitted to this Court, this Court has jurisdiction in the matter at hand.  It is not simply a “matter of judicial economy”, as the United States Attorney notes, that Calhoun seeks relief from this Court alone.  Calhoun has not had any judicial review of his “underlying tax liability” and such matters are properly the jurisdiction of U.S. District Court.  The U.S. Attorney is mistaken.  Calhoun has filed suit in this Court because it is the correct venue to do so.
 
2) The “90 day” Notice of Deficiency letter was not received by Calhoun.  It was sent to Calhoun at an incorrect or old address.  Calhoun believes that this action was intentional as there have been other cases in which IRS abuses have been so manifested.  The IRS had Calhoun’s correct address on file all along but chose to send any notices to a known incorrect address anyway in order to facilitate a means of harassing Calhoun.  Thus, Calhoun was not able to appeal the adverse decision in U.S. Tax Court. 
 
3)  Calhoun’s procedural rights have been violated in the case.  Congress has enacted a statue that guarantees Calhoun a CDPH if one is requested within the required time period.  Calhoun did make such a request but the IRS has denied it to him.  Instead, the IRS unlawfully scheduled something called a “correspondence hearing”.  Congress meant the CDPH would be a face-to-face meeting, which is the natural and normal meaning of “hearing” in a legal context. 

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “hearing” means a “Proceeding of relative formality, generally public, with definite issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which parties proceeded against have a right to be heard, and is much the same as a trial and may terminate a final order.”  Standard English dictionaries provide: “an opportunity to state your case and be heard…[by means of] the act of hearing attentively”; “To listen to in an official, professional, or formal capacity”; “An opportunity to be heard”; “A preliminary examination of an accused person”;  “A session, as of an investigatory committee or a grand jury, at which testimony is taken from witnesses”; “a proceeding of relative formality at which evidence and arguments may be presented on the matter at issue to be decided by a person or body having decision-making authority”. 

One dictionary annotation provides: “The purpose of a hearing is to provide the opportunity for each side of a dispute, and esp. a person who may be deprived of his or her rights, to present its position. A hearing, along with notice, is a fundamental part of procedural due process. Hearings are also held, as for example by a legislature or an administrative agency, for the purpose of gathering information and hearing the testimony of witnesses.” A fair hearing is “a hearing that is conducted impartially and in accordance with due process and for which the defendant has reasonable opportunity to prepare, the assistance of counsel, the right to present evidence, the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and often the right to a jury.” 

Corpus Juris Secundum says that a hearing “contemplates an opportunity to be heard”, as one examines, explains, or refutes any evidence presented, and requires the privilege to be present and “the right to present one’s contentions and to support the same by proof and argument.”  “It must be fair in all respects and not be a mere form to precede a predetermined result.”  There is to be “a listening to facts and evidence for the sake of adjudication.”  Even the IRS recognized that hearings are face-to-face when it discussed whether or not to reimburse the expenses of those traveling to personally present evidence before its examiners, To the Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (1966), 1966 WL 1798 (Comp. Gen.), 45 Comp. Gen. 654.

A hearing has to occur at an IRS appeals office closest to taxpayer’s residence unless it is not staffed with “appropriate personnel”. IRC 6320 “does not specify at what location the appeals hearing needs to take place or whether it can occur during telephone.” Being “almost an hour away” is not an “undue burden” when not substantiated as such. A telephone hearing is the only acceptable substitute mentioned, Katz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2000), 115 T.C. 329, 335, 336. A correspondence hearing is not contemplated in the law.

The idea of having an audible, face-to-face hearing is well-established in case law, and the precedents regarding what constitutes a hearing have been continued and cited for decades.  One of the essential characteristics about a “hearing” is the right to be heard, Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission (1939), 287 N.W. 122, 133, 135, 138, 143; 232 Wis. 274.  A hearing is a formal procedure where evidence may be adduced by both parties and where all have a right to be heard, In re Securities and Exchange Commission (1936), C.C.A.N.Y. 84 F.2d. 316, 318.  Both parties must be able to adduce proof and argue inferences from evidence (1966), D.B. Clayton and Associates v. McNaughton (1966), 182 So.2d 890, 891, 892, and this must be done in person or by counsel, Fiorella v. State (1960), 121 So.2d 875, 878; 40 Ala.App. 587.  In a hearing, the officer who makes determinations must consider and appraise the evidence presented, Joyce v. Bruckman (1939), 15 N.Y.S.2d 679, 681; 257 App.Div. 795.

An “opportunity to be heard” or hearing contemplates a listening to the facts and evidence for the sake of adjudication, Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Hester (1940), 109 P.2d 820, 821; 188 Okl. 394.  A hearing embodies the right to be heard on the controverted facts and on the law, Carpenters’ District Council, Detroit, Wayne, and Oakland Counties and Vicinity, of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO v. Cicci (1958), C.A.Mich, 261 F.2d 5, 8.  Furthermore, there is no hearing when the affected party does not know what evidence is offered and considered, and has no opportunity to test, explain, or refute it, and any subsequent finding without evidence is “arbitrary and baseless” (1948), Hyman v. Muller, 62 A.2d 221, 223; 1 N.J. 124 and, similarly, Moran v. School Committee of Littleton (1945), 59 N.E.2d 279, 281; 317 Mass. 591.  The IRS is viciously denying Calhoun his right to a genuine hearing.

4) Calhoun has filed this case in the appropriate court, citing three reasons: the failure of the IRS to establish Calhoun’s underlying tax liability, the IRS’s egregious procedural error in violating Calhoun’s rights by failing to provide his CDPH, and out of a concern for judicial economy so that Calhoun does not have to argue nearly identical cases before two different federal courts. The U.S. Tax Court only has jurisdiction to review a CDPH if and when a taxpayer has been informed of his tax liability, Sapp v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2003), United States T.C. Memo 2003-207. Calhoun has not been so “informed” regarding his alleged tax liability, even though he has asked the IRS to provide this information on many occasions over the last 14 years. The U.S. District Court would not have jurisdiction if only a procedural irregularity were under consideration, but since Calhoun has challenged his “underlying tax liability” as well as a procedural matter, the Court does have jurisdiction, Silver v. Smith (2003), 70 Fed.Appx. 17, 20, C.A.2 (N.Y.). The IRS has to prove underlying tax liability when no form 1040 has been properly filed and there is a lack of evidence of income, Rivera v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2003), U.S. Tax Ct. 2003, 2003 WL 345341. Calhoun did not file a form 1040 in 1991 and 1992. Normally, a taxpayer’s underlying tax liability can only be contested by petitioning U.S. Tax Court after receiving a Notice of Deficiency, Pahamotang v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2003), U.S. Tax Ct. 2003, 2003 WL 21385204. However, Calhoun never received such Notice, since the IRS purposely and knowingly sent it to an incorrect (old) address.
CONCLUSION
Calhoun has filed suit in this Court because it is the correct venue to do so.  The IRS is trying to thwart the will and intention of elected officials and the will of the people.  The bureaucracy has usurped the statutory words of Congress (the expression of the will of the people) in denying Calhoun a CDPH.  The IRS is willfully ignoring, denying, and thwarting the law, stonewalling and throwing up imaginary roadblocks to Dr. Calhoun’s judicial remedy.  Therefore, Dr. Calhoun appeals to the independent judiciary for relief from these over-zealous bureaucrats by (A) forcing the IRS to grant Dr. Calhoun his CDPH, (B) throwing out the motion to dismiss entered by the U.S. Attorney, (C) allowing this proceeding to continue in U.S. District Court rather than U.S. Tax Court, and (D) compelling the IRS and U.S. Attorney to provide proof of how they can pursue actions on old, doubtful liens that have expired under the statue of limitations.
Certificate of Service: I do hereby certify that on this date I sent properly a copy of this pleading to opposing counsel.

 

Executed on October 18, 2004.

 

Respectfully submitted,
 

___________________
John M. Calhoun, Ph.D., pro se 
P.O. Box 25
Greenville, SC 29616

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Dr. Calhoun's Reply To Answer Entered By United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

JOHN C.CALHOUN,                       }
                                      }
Plaintiff,                            }
                                      }
vs.                                   } Case No. 6:04CV2455
                                      }
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND          }
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER         }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE                   }
                                      }
Defendant(s).                         }
______________________________________}
Reply To Answer Entered By United States

This case is a judicial appeal from the two notices of determination issued by the Internal Revenue Ser-vice (hereinafter: IRS) office of appeals in Columbia, South Carolina on July 8, 2004. Under the “Collec-tion Due Process Hearing” (hereinafter: CDPH or CDP Hearing) statute in Internal Revenue Code (here-inafter: IRC) 6330, Plaintiff John M. Calhoun had thirty (30) days to appeal the adverse determination of the IRS in U.S. District Court. Calhoun is asking the Court to force the IRS to grant him a CDPH as re-quired by law. The United States filed a motion to dismiss this case on September 21, 2004, a reply in support of that motion on October 12, 2004, and an answer to Calhoun’s brief on December 6, 2004.

In reading through the answer, one cannot easily conclude what is being admitted and what is be-ing denied. It appears that the U.S. Attorney is engaging in an indolent ruse whereby she says that the government “denies” everything in general and then proceeds to “admit” every major aspect of the para-graph in question. This ploy is especially true in her responses to items #2, #3, #7, #8, #11, #15, #17, #18, and most of #19. Items #4 and #5 are statements of fact, the veracity of which can be readily seen in letters sent to the IRS (attached as exhibits to Calhoun’s complaint of July 23, 2004), or by fact that the IRS and the U.S. Attorney have thus far been unwilling to produce any Notice of Deficiency or furnish proof that it was sent to Calhoun. The denial of #19(c) is odd to say the least since it indicates that the U.S. Attorney does not believe that an “all valid assessments must emanate from a filed return”. What sort of mockery of the law is this? And what does it mean for the U.S. Attorney to deny #10 on account of her ignorance? This is a rather ridiculous response, and Calhoun requests that the court reject this particular denial and treat it as an admission.

The U.S. Attorney is stonewalling and scratching to find some answers when she knows that the facts are clearly correct. She is engaging in subterfuge and defrauding the court by showing no respect for district court Judges in South Carolina. Unlike District Court Judges in places like New York, which is renown for its political corruption, we are blessed with a good judicial system in South Carolina and its Judges are well-respected nationwide. Having lived abroad for many years (and in many other states too), and having seen and read about much judicial corruption or irresponsibility in those places, I can aver that we are judicially much better off in South Carolina than other places. However, this maneuvering by the U.S. Attorney in Washington is inconsistent with the unadulterated legal practice common in South Carolina.

Calhoun reiterates his claims of his brief of October 20, 2004:

1) Since Calhoun’s “underlying tax liability” is in question, and has been raised as an issue with the IRS, as well as the complaint and motion to dismiss submitted to this Court, this Court has jurisdiction in the matter at hand. Calhoun has filed suit in this Court because it is the correct venue to do so.

2) The “90 day” Notice of Deficiency letter was not received by Calhoun, and Calhoun believes that such an error was intentional and vicious on the part of the IRS.

3) Calhoun’s procedural rights have been violated in the case since he was denied a face-to-face hearing. The IRS and U.S. Attorney are trying to use the tax law to punish Calhoun, who is an outspoken writer, radio talk show host, and lecturer who favors liberty and free market economics, and one who denounces the abuses of government agencies like the IRS.

Certificate of Service: I do hereby certify that on this date I sent properly a copy of this pleading to opposing counsel.




Respectfully submitted December 3, 2004

_______________________________

John C. Calhoun, Ph.D., pro se
P.O. Box 25
Greenville, SC 29616

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Dr. Calhoun's Response to Reply Brief Entered by U.S.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

JOHN C.CALHOUN,                       }
                                      }
Plaintiff,                            }
                                      }
vs.                                   } Case No. 6:04CV2455
                                      }
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND          }
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER         }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE                   }
                                      }
Defendant(s).                         }
______________________________________}

RESPONSE TO REPLY BRIEF ENTERED BY UNITED STATES

The main facts of this case have been repeated over and again in the various pleadings by Plaintiff and Defendant. Pursuant to local rule 7.07, this brief responds to various new or modified allegations or statements made by the U.S. Attorney in its Motion of February 22, 2005.

1. Congress enacted legislation in the Taxpayers Bill of Rights acts that require the IRS to send correspondence to a correct address. In violation of this rule, the IRS sent notices to a known bad address, as Calhoun explained at length in his Reply and Rebuttal to Motions of February 9, 2005. It is not simply a negative aspect of the IRS sending correspondence to Calhoun’s “last known address” that the law requires; the IRS also has a positive duty to not send correspondence and notices to a known bad address. Even if the IRS complied with the negative aspect of its duty, as the U.S. Attorney contends, they did not comply with the positive aspect. While the IRS and some Congressmen like famed cheat Dan Rostenkowski opposed this legislation, it did pass and the IRS (to its chagrin) must comply with it. Calhoun requests that the court admonish the U.S. Attorney for treating the law with such indifference.

2. The U.S. Attorney continues to argue that the U.S. Tax Court has jurisdiction over some parts of this case. Calhoun has never denied that the U.S. Tax Court could have been chosen to hear parts of this complaint, but that Calhoun has the option per IRC 6330 to bring the complaint in U.S. District Court if there are questions about underlying tax liability­ which there are. Judging from the U.S. Attorney’s Motion of February 22, 2005, the IRS has already scorned Calhoun’s position and simply hopes to escape the more impartial jurisdiction of U.S. District Court in dealing with such a sensitive issue. The U.S. Attorney has already conceded that this Court has jurisdiction over at least one penalty assessed by the IRS. Calhoun is asking this Court to make a determination regarding tax liability since the IRS did not do so at a face-to-face hearing and purposely sent Calhoun notices of deficiency to a known bad address in violation of law. Furthermore, Calhoun contends that the entire matter should come before this Court, not just the frivolous return penalty.

3. The U.S. Attorney argues that the IRS denied Calhoun a face-to-face hearing based on their belief that Calhoun held to “frivolous” arguments twelve or thirteen years ago. Even if such were the case, why would it have any bearing on whether Calhoun should have a face-to-face hearing in 2005? Since Calhoun did not meet with the IRS for a hearing in 1993 or 1994, how is it that the IRS has determined that Calhoun’s arguments are frivolous? The first time in which Calhoun presented a full argument for IRS viewing was in his “Notice Regarding Plaintiff’s Underlying Legal Basis” to this Court on February 14, 2005. So how could the IRS have made such a judgment of frivolity over a dozen years prior? Such a Notice cannot serve as grounds for denial of a face-to-face hearing.

Calhoun admits that he raised arguments in 1992 and 1993 that the IRS considered to be “frivolous”. But so what? Calhoun has not raised any recent arguments that would permit the IRS to deny a face-to-face hearing in June 2004 or sometime in 2005. The Notice filed in this court in February 2005 provides no grounds for an IRS appeals officer to have made a decision a year earlier to deny Calhoun a face-to-face hearing. The Treasury Regulations are not the law, even if they are often treated with similar force. The IRC does not say that a face-to-face hearing may be disallowed by the caprice and whim of the IRS. It is precisely the proper function of this Court to handle disputes over what the law means and the intention of Congress rather than merely accept the fancies of the Treasury Department.

4. The U.S. Attorney and the IRS have attempted to belittle their lies by saying that their allegations about Calhoun being involved in the Pilot Connection Society are effectively irrelevant. But this is not so. The U.S. Attorney has tried to paint a picture of Calhoun as a “tax-protester” and therefore not entitled to a face-to-face hearing on account of his frivolous arguments. Therefore, the Pilot Connection is relevant to the case. Calhoun pointed out other lies of the U.S. Attorney in his Reply and Rebuttal to Motions of February 9, 2005, as well as the U.S. Attorney and IRS’s belligerent and bald-faced lawbreaking by calling Calhoun a “tax-protester”. Yet there has been no remorse or retraction of the lies and characterizations of Calhoun. Thus, Calhoun requests that this Court again reprimand the U.S. Attorney and the IRS for these wrongful actions.

5. In Paragraph 4 of its Motion of February 22, 2005, the U.S. Attorney seriously misled this Court (and nearly lied) by insinuating that they complied with the Scheduling Order of this Court to complete discovery by February 18, 2005. Calhoun submitted clear, concise discoverable information requests and relevant interrogatories, but the U.S. Attorney used missives to avoid providing Calhoun with the information needed to proceed with his case. They did not respond in any useful or meaningful way to Calhoun’s requests. Instead, they used blanket objections to his simple and easy to understand questions, and whining about them being too burdensome.

Certificate of Service: I do hereby certify that on this date I delivered properly a copy of this pleading to opposing counsel.

Executed on February 28, 2005.

Respectfully submitted,

John C. Calhoun, pro se

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Dr. Calhoun's Reply and Rebuttal to Motions

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

JOHN C.CALHOUN,                       }
                                      }
Plaintiff,                            }
                                      }
vs.                                   } Case No. 6:04CV2455
                                      }
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND          }
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER         }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE                   }
                                      }
Defendant(s).                         }
______________________________________}
REPLY AND REBUTTAL TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF (JUDGE FLOYD) OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO STAY DISCOVERY BY UNITED STATES (JANUARY 18, 2005)

The main facts of this case have been repeated over and again in the various pleadings by Plaintiff and Defendant. This brief answers and rebuts several motions by defendant. Unless ex-plicitly admitted, Calhoun denies all allegations of the U.S. Attorney in her motions and exhibits of January 18, 2005.

1. The Department of Justice has lied. Calhoun has never been a member of (or in any way involved with) “The Pilot Connection Society”, nor has he ever heard of such a group other than in IRS pleadings or letters. Government exhibit 16 does not show any connection between Calhoun and this society. Government exhibit 19 merely asserts this connection and that examination of Calhoun’s tax liability was therefore put into something known as the “Phoenix project”—whatever that was—but does not provide any proof of Calhoun’s alleged “connection”. Defendant is clearly fabricating spurious arguments in its case against Calhoun, and Calhoun requests that this Court force the IRS to disclose the nature of the “Phoenix project” and to stop these specious allegations against Calhoun.

In government exhibit 19 (Form 4318, page 2) IRS Agent Pat Brown calls Calhoun “an ille-gal tax protester.” His assertion is false; a mere fabrication. Calhoun has never been involved in any illegal or wrongful activity or association of any kind of “tax protest” scheme and denies being or having any nexus with an illegal or wrongful “tax protester” (as the term is used in IRS parlance and polemics, i.e., in the IRS’s view, one who breaks the law in some putative respect—the clear and only sense in which IRS uses such terms at all times—necessarily implying illegality with or without the adjective “illegal” on the IRS webpage).

On the contrary, Calhoun was endeavoring to comply with the law, and had undertaken regular correspondence with the IRS in order to make sure that his understanding of the law was correct. On the Forms 1040NR filed, as well as many other confirmatory writings, Calhoun asked the IRS to respond within 30 days if they did not agree with his conclusions. Calhoun usually sent 2nd and 3rd notices of the same correspondence. Yet the IRS did not respond (at least not with sub-stantive answers) within 30, 60, or even 90 days. When Calhoun left Oregon for graduate school in Virginia, he had every reason to believe that the IRS agreed with his position after having sent such confirmatory writings.

Government exhibit 19 shows that IRS Agent Pat Brown falsely and maliciously asserted that Calhoun “has refused to cooperate” and “has actively attempted to thwart attempts to determine his substantially correct tax liability”. However, Calhoun wrote to the IRS on many occasions and will produce evidence of this correspondence and lack of substantial replies from the IRS during the trial phase. The IRS is lying. How can such refusals and thwarting be accurately said of one who is regularly corresponding with the IRS?

Calhoun asserts that such false accusations are typical of IRS bullying and demands that the IRS produce evidence of any membership in (or action with) the Pilot Connection Society or any tax protester activities. If the IRS is in fact engaged in a long-term program to chill pure First Amendment activity, this further belies its stated purposes of fair, honest tax collection, period, to the point that a formal investigation would theoretically be called for.

The Department of Justice has also lied about the Patriot Network. This group has not had any cases thrown out for being “frivolous” during its thirty years of its operation. Calhoun is not a member of this network, although he has been invited on many occasions to lecture on the academic areas in which he has written (e.g., public policy, theologies about civil government, property rights, free-market economics, and market-based social institutions).

Calhoun was initially asked to speak about his latest book, Bible and Government: Public Pol-icy from a Christian Perspective, by the Patriot Network leadership. After completing what the leaders considered a very successful and fruitful lecture series, Calhoun was invited to speak on other subjects wherein he had some expertise. Moreover, Calhoun has also been invited to speak from his fields of knowledge to other highly varied organizations, many quite prestigious, both nationally and internationally.

In the last few years, for instance, he has been an invited speaker at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC, La Fundación Atlas in Buenos Aires, and university seminars in Belgium, Aix-en-Provence, France, Prague, Czech Republic, Guatemala, and Belgrade. Locally, Calhoun has spoken before many groups including Americans for Constitutional Government, several homeschool association meetings, the Rotary Club, church groups, as well as at other meetings on an informal basis.

Absent evidence to prove Calhoun’s involvement in the Pilot Connection Society or a tax protest scheme or group, Calhoun hereby requests that this Court compel the IRS to remove all such assertion(s) and charge(s) from any and all of Calhoun’s record(s) and file(s) on file with any and all agencies and instrumentalities, including but not limited to the Internal Revenue Service.

In government exhibit 6, Mary Green flagrantly lies and falsely claims that Calhoun “conducts seminars around the country advancing arguments against taxes that Federal Courts have determined to be frivolous” and states that Calhoun “is a college professor who conducts seminars that advance frivolous argument [sic] against taxation.” These allegations are false. Neither Mary Green nor the IRS have any evidence to support these allegations and Calhoun avers that he has not conducted any such seminars. Calhoun has not been a “college professor” since 2002, but he does have recognized expertise in conventional public policy and free market economics topics. His books are published and are widely available. None of these books include any of the topics that Mary Green fraudulently stated. The U.S. Attorney and Mary Green have chosen to make up lies rather than take time to review Calhoun’s books and articles, which would conclusively show that Calhoun has not written and advanced such “arguments against taxes”. Calhoun refuses to be a casualty of (or the brunt of) the U.S. Attorney’s laziness in researching their allegations by not reading Calhoun’s work.

In government exhibit 15, IRS Appeals Agents Cathy Lacienski and/or Jeanette Amaker state that it “clearly appears” that Calhoun is “tax challenged and won’t get a face or face [sic] anyway.” Calhoun considers this language to be offensive and requests that this court require the IRS to issue a written apology for publishing such a judgment. Furthermore, Calhoun finds in this language more evidence of IRS abuse as they have evinced their intention to railroad Calhoun from the start, without allowing him a face-to-face hearing provided for him by Congress.

Calhoun respectfully requests that the Court reprimand and admonish the U.S. Attorney for using allegations that are known to be spurious or baseless. Calhoun further asks the Court to note that if such allegations are wrong then the court should likewise doubt the IRS’s other allegations against Calhoun.

Calhoun is a law-abiding citizen and has always endeavored to uphold the law and resents the IRS’s claims and insinuations that he is in any way a lawbreaker. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98) § 3707 and internal IRS guidelines prohibit the designation of taxpayers as “Illegal Tax Protesters” or any similar designations. Calhoun requests that the court reprimand the Defendant and the U.S. Attorney for their callous disregard of the law. The prohibition has been in effect seven years, and as of September 6, 2002—just over two years ago—the IRS only then began to make mediocre progress in obeying it.

2. The IRS and the government oppose Calhoun because he has been active in groups such as the Association of Christian Freeman, a trust formed to promote the study of law with respect to Christian principles, as well as his academic pursuits, weekly newspaper column, books, and radio broadcast, all of which decry IRS abuses on occasion. The Defendant has been trying to punish Calhoun with the law for many years. And Calhoun thus seeks relief from the IRS’s tyranny by means of this Court.

3. What Calhoun knows about the law he learned through self-study and through attending lectures on Constitutional Law. Calhoun has an impressive set of academic credentials and is able to do his own research. Calhoun does not follow a packaged plan for dealing with the IRS and gaining his understanding of the law. This fact should be apparent by reading this brief and the ensuing Notice of Underlying Legal Basis. Furthermore, Calhoun does not assist (and has never assisted) others in filing documents with the IRS.

4. Calhoun further disputes the U.S. Attorney’s presentation of the “facts” of this case, particularly with regard to Calhoun’s underlying tax liability and correspondence with the IRS over the last fifteen (15) months. However, Calhoun contends that this complaint is directed primarily to forcing the IRS to grant him a face-to-face Collections Due Process Hearing (which is his right under the law: I.R.C. 6330), and secondarily to ask this Court to make a determination about Calhoun’s underlying tax liability. The U.S. Attorney has raised issues and discussed “facts” in its Motion to Dismiss of January 18, 2005 that merely provide her opinions or interpretations about Calhoun’s position regarding his underlying legal basis, and detract from the primary issue at hand: forcing the IRS to grant a face-to-face Collections Due Process Hearing with Calhoun—whether or not he brings witnesses and a tape recorder.

In government exhibit 6, Mary Green again lies and falsely claims that Calhoun made statements to her at the “correspondence hearing”. Calhoun made no statements at all during this “hearing” but instead requested a face-to-face hearing, which is his right, and which the IRS has repeatedly denied it to him. Calhoun did not submit any documents to Mary Green’s correspondence hearing because Calhoun was demanding his right to a face-to-face hearing instead. Thus, Mary Green’s sworn statement is perjured.

5. The current legal process has been about forcing the IRS to grant Calhoun a face-to-face Collection Due Process Hearing. Calhoun was denied this hearing, even though he properly requested collection alternatives within the thirty (30) day period specified by Congress.

The Defendant has argued that the Treasury Department can modify what Congress has said, and now the issue is before this court to decide what the law means. However, Congress has not placed preconditions for exercising one’s right to a Collections Due Process Hearing. The IRS has unilaterally held that Calhoun is out of compliance but Congress has not said so.

The IRS is always trying to put itself above the law, and this case provides an example of their abuse. Calhoun should not have to jump through the IRS’s hoops. Their barriers are unlawful and self-serving, going beyond what Congress has enacted.

Furthermore, what would the IRS have Calhoun to do? Does it really want the inefficiencies of Calhoun filing form 1040 “zero” tax returns for years in which he had no tax liability from 1993 to 2003, especially given the fact that Calhoun was either a full time graduate student (with no significant earnings) or lived in South America for eight (8) of those years! If anything, Calhoun would have been due the Earned Income Credit and other welfare state benefits given that he had between four and six children plus a dependent wife during that period. But everyone knows that the IRS is not happy with so-called “zero” returns so why would they want them from Calhoun? The hypothetical exercise noted above is simply an analytical heuristic used to make a point. Calhoun contends, of course, that he has had no tax liability to report on a Form 1040.

The U.S. Attorney is trying to deny Calhoun his right to a face-to-face Collections Due Process Hearing by stating that Calhoun used, in its erroneous judgment, “frivolous” arguments about tax liability over ten years ago. Yet the IRS did not so respond to Calhoun’s queries at that time. And what would such issues, even if they were true in 1991 and 1992 (though they are certainly not true), have to do with Calhoun exercising his right to have a face-to-face Collections Due Process Hearing twelve (12) years later? Calhoun asks this Court for relief from the IRS apparently thinking that there is no time limit on how far it can pursue civil matters against Calhoun.

6. Defendant cites Treasury Regulation in defense of its use of a correspondence hearing in-stead of a face-to-face hearing. However, the Treasury Regulations are not law. The Collection Due Process Hearing is not similar to the Collection Appeal Program that the IRS used to have ear-lier. The former is an act of Congress while the latter was a mere internal procedure.

Congress did not intend that the Treasury Department should be able to trample on the rights of citizens by modifying the law to suit its needs best. The IRS is correct in bringing up that there were Constitutional, statutory and judicial arguments made by Calhoun over a decade ago. Calhoun raised those issues with the IRS on many occasions and never received anything but temporizing and obfuscating letters from the IRS. Calhoun has not thus far used such issues as arguments in this case, but he is willing to raise these issues now (since the U.S. Attorney has opened the matter), and will be notifying the Court regarding his underlying legal basis for his actions ten (10) to fifteen (15) years ago.

7. Calhoun never received a Notice of Deficiency allegedly sent to him on March 31, 1994. According to government exhibit 19, this Notice of Deficiency was purposely sent to three bad ad-dresses. The U.S. Attorney states that they have proof of sending the Notice of Demand letter more recently but still have not provided proof of sending the required Notice of Deficiency twelve (12) years ago. Calhoun did not sign any postal tracer that indicated his receipt of such Notice of Deficiency. For all anyone knows, the IRS had their Notice of Deficiency returned to them and then they just filed it as if it were received (even though it was not) anyway—just to be spiteful. IRS Agent Pat Brown apparently has a sufficiently malicious character to do so.

The IRS willfully used a known bad address in order to make sure that Calhoun had no opportunity to contest the Notice of Deficiency’s false claims about his taxable income. Calhoun moved several times during 1993 and 1994, having addresses in several cities in Oregon, as well as addresses in West Virginia. Calhoun was a graduate student during that time and his various familial, educational, and financial obligations created a need for his relocation on several occasions.

The IRS admits that it mailed a Notice of Deficiency to Calhoun’s known old business (not home) address in Oregon on March 31, 1994 (government exhibit 11)— even though Calhoun had never lived at that address and had not used that address for well over a year! The IRS knew that Calhoun had moved since, as government exhibit 10 shows that around September 3, 1993 the IRS had a letter returned to them as undeliverable. Yet the IRS still sent the Notice of Deficiency letter seven months later to Calhoun’s previous office which would have been known to be a bad address to any reasonable person. Calhoun was a graduate student living in Virginia in March 1994. The IRS knew that Calhoun was in Virginia, too, since they tried to levy Calhoun’s meager graduate student stipend. Calhoun had never seen this Notice of Deficiency before January 2005, and then only in the government’s exhibit for this proceeding.

Modern Americans move frequently—especially those doing graduate studies. The IRS knew that they had not sent correspondence to Calhoun’s known address. The IRS’s exhibits in this case demonstrate that the IRS knew about many of Calhoun’s address changes. Yet they did not make a good faith effort to ensure that Calhoun received the IRS’s Notices.

I.R.C. 6330 outlaws bad or incorrect IRS collection procedures. The IRS sent a Notice of Deficiency to a known bad address and thus did not fulfill its procedural obligations. Congress passed I.R.C. 6330 to stop such IRS abuses. Moreover, by saying that they have proof of sending a Notice of Demand letter, but have conspicuously left out the proof for the Notice of Deficiency letter, the Defendant has made an implicit admission by omission. The missing proof of the latter was left out and provides an indirect admission from silence.

8. Defendant has refused to hear or produce evidence that Calhoun has a tax liability and when confronted has made every effort to evade the process of law. For instance, Mary Green, IRS Appeals Officer in Columbia, SC, cannot possibly know the facts or testify to what happened in Oregon 12 to 14 years earlier. If this is how she operates, she must (as if to confirm the jaundiced public perception of things) be little more than a faceless bureaucrat processing paperwork in a rote manner without knowing any facts.

Likewise, the U.S. Attorney has endeavored to avoid discovery by refusing to completely answer Calhoun’s interrogatories and requests for the production of documents. In their responses of January 31, 2005, they have used colorful language such as “vague”, “overly burdensome”, “unclear”, and “argumentative” to describe Calhoun’s clearly straightforward requests. The U.S. Attorney should be reprimanded for this attempt to derail the process of law. The IRS has something to hide in this case and the U.S. Attorney knows it.

9. Mary Green states that Calhoun “failed to dispute” these assessments. But how could Calhoun do so? He was never advised that the (errant) assessments were made since the IRS will-fully mailed the Notice of Deficiency to a known bad address? In government exhibit 6, Mary Green admits that the IRS knew that the “Notice of Deficiencies were returned to the IRS because Taxpayer had moved from his business”, but the IRS made no effort to verify that Calhoun’s address was correct prior to sending said Notice, and in fact knew that he had moved since he had been corresponding with them from a different address in Oregon for over a year!

10. Calhoun corresponded with the IRS frequently during 1991 through 1994. Calhoun asked careful, responsible legal questions and received lame or put-off answers in reply. Calhoun disclosed precisely what he was doing (with filing Forms 1040NR, etc.) and told the IRS his good-faith belief about (and understanding of) the law (Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991)). He asked the IRS to show him where he was wrong, which they failed to do. Last July, Calhoun once again corresponded with the IRS in Washington, DC in order to clarify matters of law but received no reply. The IRS still refuses to respond to correspondence from Calhoun regarding legal questions. In U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (1977), the court ruled that “Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading... We cannot condone this shocking conduct...If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately”. Calhoun realizes that he must consult both statute and regulations to find out what duty, if any, he owes with regard to the income tax (United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431 (1960)). Calhoun has done so. The IRS refuses to treat Calhoun as a citizen with rights and legitimate questions.

11. The U.S. Attorney’s interpretation of the law in I.R.C. 6303 (in her Motion to Dismiss of January 18, 2004) invites further IRS abuse. The pertinent part of that section states: “Such notice shall be left at the dwelling or usual place of business of such person, or shall be sent by mail to such person's last known address.” Congress did not intend that this code section provide the IRS a means of sending important correspondence to a known bad address and then, when impaling its victim, to claim immunity or innocence under the provision. Since the IRS has been negligent in its dealings with Calhoun, and is intentionally malicious in its intent to punish Calhoun with the tax law, Calhoun requests that this Court not stand for the IRS’s chicanery or attempts to candy-coat its bad behavior, despite attempts by the U.S. Attorney to finagle this Court with eloquent rationalizations.

12. The IRS has evidently extended the liens filed against Calhoun by two years and nine months based on a determination under I.R.C. 6503(c). The pertinent part of that code section says: “Taxpayer outside United States[:] The running of the period of limitations on collection after assessment prescribed in section 6502 shall be suspended for the period during which the taxpayer is outside the United States if such period of absence is for a continuous period of at least 6 months.” Calhoun admits that he was in Chile during the period indicated in government exhibit 27 (January 1998 to April 2000). However, Calhoun occasionally returned during that time to the United States—California and Virginia in particular—mostly to what amounted to his permanent address here. Thus, Calhoun was not entirely living out of the country for purposes of the code section in question. He was teaching in Chile mainly, along with stints in Guatemala, Argentina, and Europe. Calhoun requests that the Court review the basis for the IRS’s extension of its liens against Calhoun (and the period of the statute of limitations to collect). These liens are illegal and based on incorrect information and thus should be removed entirely. In the mean time, however, Calhoun asks that this Court eliminate or significantly reduce the allowable time for the extension based on I.R.C. 6503(c).

13. The U.S. Attorney wants to remove this case from this Court because it claims that Calhoun has no right to challenge the alleged tax liability. They are mistaken and are trying to use a sly means of not dealing with the issue. They are now trying to bring up “Constitutional” or political arguments in order to divert the focus away from the face-to-face Collections Due Process Hearing matter

Thus, while Calhoun realizes that this case is primarily about getting a face-to-face Collections Due Process Hearing, he will soon file a substantial Notice of Underlying Legal Basis with the Court in order to counter the claims and “evidence” submitted by the U.S. Attorney in her January 18, 2005 Motion to Dismiss. Calhoun’s Notice of Underlying Legal Basis will demonstrate that Calhoun’s legal basis and argument is hardly unreasonable, “groundless”, “wrong”, or “frivolous”. Calhoun disagrees with the U.S. Attorney that his “ten-page letter to the IRS dated May 11, 1993” fully outlined his position or legal basis, although he admits that it comprised part of such basis. Calhoun agrees with the implied reasoning of the U.S. Attorney that Calhoun’s tax liability should be discussed in this Court and he again asserts that this Court is the proper venue for all such concerns per I.R.C. 6330(d).

Calhoun denies and rejects the blundering assertion and income figures of the U.S. Attorney: “Plainly, Calhoun is not a nonresident alien, and he was required to report his annual income (in excess of $100,000) on a U.S. Income Tax Return (Form 1040).” Calhoun denies the unsubstantiated and false claim of IRS Appeals Officers Mary Green and Pat Brown et al that he “had taxable income of $89,680” in 1991 and in 1992 “had taxable income of $176,601”. These figures are pure falsehood and ridiculous. The government’s exhibits show deposit receipts from different banks without taking into account the source of the deposits, including new loans deposited into the account, gifts, and transfers from one account to another. The IRS has no proof of such claims—only the wishful thinking and/or malicious intent of Mary Green over a decade later.

14. Finally, Calhoun requests that this Court force the U.S. Attorney to comply, or at least attempt to comply with, Calhoun’s interrogatories. The U.S. Attorney has been unwilling to make a fair attempt at providing Calhoun with discovery and information relevant to this case. While Calhoun empathizes with the added workload that cases like this one pose for the U.S. Attorney, at least she is paid to do it. Calhoun, on the other hand, brings this case without pay and has a far greater reason to claim that the erroneous and malicious arguments of the IRS have been “overly burdensome”, “vague”, “unclear”, and “argumentative”. Calhoun asks that the court direct the U.S. Attorney to stop her whining about her workload and produce answers and documents to the interrogatories and requested discovery. Calhoun likewise opposes the U.S. Attorney’s Motion to Stay discovery entered January 18, 2005 and asks that this Court compel the U.S. Attorney to comply with the scheduling order entered by this Court.

Certificate of Service: I do hereby certify that on this date I delivered properly a copy of this plead-ing to opposing counsel.

Executed on February 9, 2005.

Respectfully submitted,

_________________
John C. Calhoun, Ph.D., pro se

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Dr. Calhoun's Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

JOHN C.CALHOUN,                       }
                                      }
Plaintiff,                            }
                                      }
vs.                                   } Case No. 6:04CV2455
                                      } UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND         
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER         }
                                      }
OF INTERNAL REVENUE                   }Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories
                                      }
Defendant(s).                         }
______________________________________}

Discovery

To: Defendant (or his attorney)
Requester, pursuant to Rule 34 FRCivP, requests that you allow the inspection and copying of the following documents and other items at your office at 10:00 A.M. on the thirtieth (30th) day after service of this upon you:
1. Each and every document, record and material that you have or can obtain about requester and his party.

2. Each and every document, record and material that you have or can obtain about this action or pertaining to it.

3. Each and every document, record and material about or pertaining to this requester and this action held of obtainable by your attorney and the firm or agency for which he works.

4. The documents of yours and your attorney are pertaining to the witnesses in this case or potential witnesses.
This request is continuing in nature and applies to documents as described above that hereafter are obtained by you.

Persons Likely to Have Discoverable Information

Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A), the following listed persons are likely to have discoverable information for obtaining the items listed above, as well as information to answer the interrogatories in the ensuing section. Direct phone numbers were not available to Calhoun for these persons but, presumably, the defendant will have these phone numbers.

Mary Green, Settlement Officer
Catherine L. Lacienski, Appeals Team Manager
Internal Revenue Service Appeals Office
1835 Assembly St., Suite 508, MDP 43
Columbia, SC 29201
Re: Woman who did the CDPH "correspondence hearing" in mid 2004 in Columbia, SC.

Glenda G. Cox, Manager
Data Control Team
Internal Revenue Service
Memphis, TN
Re: Signed certificates of official record showing substitute return filed for Calhoun in 1991 and 1992 showed liens extended
for 2 3/4 years. She should know the reasons/justifications for these actions.

Thomas R. Booher
Internal Revenue Service
960 Ellendale, Suite A
Medford, OR 97504
Re: Resurrected the Calhoun case in late 2003 and transferred it to Mary Green in Columbia. He should have information about Calhoun’s alleged tax liability, and proof of such claims.

Ann Cameron, Revenue Agent
Internal Revenue Service
310 W. 6th St., Room 304
Medford, OR 97501
Re: Did not send notice of deficiency and refused to provide "point-by-point" answers to Calhoun’s inquiries during 1992-1993.

William Mesure, IRS Affiliate/Agent
Earline Connell, IRS Affiliate/Agent
Noemi Ortiz, IRS Affiliate/Agent
Internal Revenue Service, Service Center
Philadelphia, PA 19255
Re: Gave Calhoun the runaround over documents submitted 1992; left unanswered correspondence.

Interrogatories

Pursuant to Rule 33, FRCivP, Requester requests that you answer the following Interrogatories within 30 days, separately, fully, in writing, and under oath. As used herein, the term “identify” with reference to an individual means to furnish his name, job title, business address, present job description and relation to this action. With reference to a document, the term “identify” means to state its nature, its date, its author and addressee, its description, its present location and custodian.

1. Identify all documents, records, tapes, material, objects, etc. related in any way to this case and the parties hereto.

2. Identify all persons; witnesses, potential witnesses, parties, etc. involved any way with this case, the parties or documents.

3. Identify all persons who assisted in responding to this discovery motion.

4. Do you have record of (and a copy of) a Notice of Deficiency that was allegedly mailed to Calhoun?

5. Do you have record of (and a copy of) a 90-day Demand Letter that was allegedly mailed to Calhoun?

6. Is it not true that the Internal Revenue Service made no effort to find a correct address for Calhoun?

7. Is it not true that the Internal Revenue Service sent notices in 1993-1994 to a known bad address?

8. Is it not true that the Internal Revenue Service has no evidence (in the form of a signed tax return) to back up its allegations that Calhoun has a tax liability for years 1991 and 1992? If it continues to claim to have such documentation, why has the Internal Revenue Service been unwilling to provide a copy of it to Calhoun?

9. After nearly a decade of allowing this dispute to lie dormant, why has the Internal Revenue Service now decided to come out and attack Calhoun?

10. Is it not true that the Internal Revenue Service’s reasons for attacking Calhoun are at least in part fueled by the Internal Revenue Service’s desire to assail Calhoun for his outspoken views in favor of liberty and free markets, and against Internal Revenue Service abuses.

11. What law, statute, regulation, or internal memorandum or letter gave the Internal Revenue Service authority to extend the tax liens against Calhoun, which have now expired by statute of limitations? Please produce a copy and send it to Plaintiff.

12. What law, statute, regulation, or internal memorandum or letter gave the Internal Revenue Service authority to conduct a “correspondence hearing” instead of a face-to-face hearing? Please produce a copy and send it to Plaintiff.

13. Is it not true that the Internal Revenue Service ignored and denied Calhoun’s request for a face-to-face hearing near his home? By what authority and by whose direction did it do so?

These Interrogatories are continuing in nature and apply to information that here after is obtained by you.

Certificate of Service: I do hereby certify that on this date I delivered properly a copy of this pleading to opposing counsel.

Executed on January 8, 2005.


______________________
John C. Calhoun, Ph.D., pro se
P.O. Box 25
Greenville, SC 29616

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