Mr. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and Mr. Justice Stevens, joined.


1. Internal Revenue ~1451
Section of Internal Revenue Code permitting use of summons for purpose of ascertaining correctness of any return, determining liability of any person for any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, necessarily permits use of summons for examination of suspected tax fraud and for calculation of 50% civil penalty. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7602.

2. Internal Revenue ~1451
Congress has not categorized tax fraud investigations into civil and criminal components, but rather intended to design system with interrelated criminal and civil elements, and any limitation on good-faith use of internal revenue summons must reflect that statutory premise. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.
1954) § 7602.

3. Internal Revenue ~1451
Rule forbidding issuance of Internal Revenue Service summons after recommendation of criminal prosecution to Department of Justice is prophylactic intended to safeguard standards of criminal litigation discovery and role of grand jury as principal tool of criminal accusation; given interrelated criminal/civil nature of tax fraud investigation whenever it remains within jurisdiction of service, and given utility of summons to investigate civil tax liability, court will not impose prophylactic restraint
on summons authority any earlier than at recommendation to Department of Justice.
26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7602.

4. Internal Revenue c=~145I
Prior to recommendation for prosecution to Department of Justice, Internal Revenue Service must use its summons authority in good faith; dispositive question in each case is whether Service is pursuing
authorized purposes in good faith or whether it has abandoned, in institutional sense, pursuit of civil tax determination or collection. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7602.

5. Internal Revenue ~145I
That single special agent intends only to gather evidence for criminal investigation is not diS1)OSitive of question of good faith of IRS as institution in issuing summons; those resisting enforcement of summons have heavy burden of disproving actual existence of valid civil tax determination or collection purpose by IRS. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7602.

6. Internal Revenue ~145I
Internal Revenue Service does not enjoy inherent authority to summon production of private papers of citizens, but may only exercise that authority granted by Congress. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7602.

7. Internal Revenue ~1451
Congress intended Internal Revenue Service summons authority to be used to aid determination and collection of taxes, which purposes do not include goal of filing criminal charges against citizens; consequently, summons authority does not exist to aid criminal investigations solely. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7602.

8. Internal Revenue ~I46O
District court erred in refusing to enforce Internal Revenue Service summonses issued to hank on basis of finding that special agent was investigating taxpayer solely for purpose of unearthing evidence of
criminal conduct, since such finding did not necessarily lead to conclusion that summonses were not issued in good-faith pursuit of congressionally authorized purposes.
26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7602.

                                                                 Syllabus *
     Petitioner special agent of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in the process of investigating a taxpayer’s tax liability, issued summonses to respondent bank under authority of § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (which permits use of a summons “[f]or the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return, . . . determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or collecting any such liability”) to appear before the agent and produce files of certain land trusts, created for the benefit of the tax-payer. When respondent bank official appeared in response to the summons but refused to produce the files, the United States and the agent petitioned the District Court for enforcement of the summonses. That court denied enforcement, finding that the summonses were not issued in good faith because they were issued “solely for the purpose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct” by the taxpayer. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The District Court erred in refusing to enforce the summonses, since its finding that the agent was investigating the taxpayer “solely for the purpose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct” does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the summonses were not issued in good-faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602. Pp. 2363—2368.

* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S 321, 337, 26 S. Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

     (a) Congress has not categorized tax fraud investigation into civil and criminal components but has created a tax enforcement system in which criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined, and
any limitation on the good-faith use of an IRS summons must reflect this statutory premise. Pp. 2363-2365.
     (b) To enforce a summons under § 7602, the primary requirement is that it be issued before the IRS recommends to the Department of Justice the initiation of a criminal prosecution relating to the subject
matter of the summons. This is a prophylactic rule designed to protect the standards of criminal litigation discovery and the role of the grand jury as a principal tool of criminal accusation. P. 2365.
     (c) Enforcement of a summons is also conditioned upon the good faith use of the summons authority by the IRS, which must not abandon its institutional responsibility to determine and to collect taxes and civil fraud penalties. That a single special agent intends only to gather evidence for a criminal investigation is not dispositive of the good faith of the IRS as an institution. Those resisting enforcement of a summons must disprove the actual existence of a valid civil tax determination or collection
purpose by the IRS. Pp. 2366—2368.
     (d) On the record here respondents have not shown sufficient justification to preclude enforcement of the summonses in question, absent any recommendation to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution and absent any showing that the special agent already possessed all of the evidence sought in the summonses or that the IRS in an institutional sense had abandoned pursuit of the taxpayer’s civil tax liability. p. 2368. 554 F.2d 302, reversed with directions to remand.

                                                               ________________

Lawrence G. Wallace, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Matt P. Cushner, Chicago, Ill., for respondents.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

     This case is a supplement to our decision in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 91 S.Ct. 534, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971). It presents the issue whether the District Court correctly refused to enforce Internal Revenue Service summonses when it specifically found that the special agent who is-
sued them “was conducting his investigation solely for the purpose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct.” 76-1 U.S. T.C. 84,072, 84,073, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-1239, 76- 1240 (ND III.1976).

                                                                    I

     In May 1975, John F. Olivero, a special agent with the Intelligence Division of the Chicago District of the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS or the Service), received an assignment to investigate the tax liability of John Gattuso for his taxable years 197o-1972; App. 26 27, 33. Olivero testified that he had requested the assignment because of information he had received from a confidential informant and from an unrelated investigation, Id., at 35. The case was not referred to the IRS from another law enforcement agency, but the nature of the assignment, Olivero testified was “[t]o investigate the possibility of any criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code.” Id., at 33. Olivero pursued the case
on his own, without the assistance of a revenue agent.’ 1.   He received information about Gattuso from the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a result of the previous investigation. Id., at 36. He solicited and
received additional data from the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, the Secret Service, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the IRS Collection Division, and Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago. Id., at 37-40.
     Mr. Gattuso’s tax returns for the years in question disclosed rental income from real estate. That property was held in Illinois land trusts 2. by respondent LaSalle National Bank, as trustee, a fact revealed by land trust files collected by the IRS from banks. Id., at 27, 45. In order to determine the
accuracy of Gattuso’s income reports, Olivero proceeded to issue two summonses, under the authority of § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 7602,3. to respondent bank. Each summons related to a separate trust and requested, among other things, that the bank as trustee appear
before Olivero at a designated time and place and produce its “files relating to Trust No. 31544 [or No. 35396] including the Trust Agreement” for the period 1970 through 1972 and also “all deeds, options, correspondence, closing statements and seller statements, escrows, and tax bills pertaining to all property held in the trust at any time during” that period. App. 9-16. Respondent Joseph W. Lang, a vice president of the bank, appeared in response to the summonses but, on advice of counsel, refused to produce any of the material requested. Brief for Respondents 2.

The IJnited States and Olivero, pursuant to § 7402(b) and 7604(a) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7402(b) and 7604(a),4 then petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for enforcement of the summonses. App. 5. This was on November 11, 1975. Olivero testified that when the petition was filed he had not determined whether criminal charges were justified and had not made any report or recommendation about the case to his superiors. Id., at 30. It was alleged in the
petition and in an incorporated exhibit that the requested materials were necessary for the determination of the tax liability of Gattuso for the years in question and that the information contained in the documents was not in the possession of the petitioners. Id., at 7,17-18. The District Court entered
an order to show cause, Id., at 19, and respondents answered through counsel, who also represented Gattuso. Id., at 20-22.

At the ensuing hearing and in a post hearing brief, respondents argued that 0livero’s investigation was “purely criminal” in nature. . Id., at 82. Gregory J. Perry, a lawyer specializing in federal taxation and
employed by the same law firm that filed the answer, testified that in June 1975 0livero told him that the Gattuso investigation “was strictly related to criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code.” Id., at 52. Respondents conceded that they bore the burden of proving that enforcement of the summons would abuse the court’s process, but they contended that they did not have to show “that there is no
civil purpose to the Summons.” Id., at 87. Instead, they urged that their burden was to show that the summonses were not issued in good faith because “the investigation is solely for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.” Id., at 77.

notes--------------

1.    Frequently, a revenue agent of the IRS Audit Division will refer a case on which he is working to the Intelligence Division for investigation of possible fraud. After such a referral, and at other times, the special agent and the revenue agent work together. Because of the importance and sensitivity of the criminal aspects of the joint investigation, the special agent assumes control of the inquiry. See e. g., Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 4500, t’ 4563.432—
4565.44 (1976 and 1978).
     The Audit Division and the Intelligence Division have now been redesignated as the Examinations Division and the Criminal Enforcement Division, respectively. IRS News Release, February 6, 1978.

2.      Respondents describe an Illinois land trust as follows An Illinois land trust is a contract by which
a trustee is vested with both legal and equitable title to real property and the interest of the beneficiary is considered personal property. Under this trust the beneficiary or any person designated in writing by the beneficiary has the exclusive power to direct or control the trustee in dealing with the title and the exclusive control of the management, operation, renting and
selling of the trust property together with the exclusive right to the earnings, avails and proceeds of said property. lll.Rev.Stat. ch. 29, § 8.31 (1971). Brief for Respondents 1-2, n. 1. 2359

3.      Section 7602 reads:
“For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized  “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;   “(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and “(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.’

4. Section 7402(b) states:
       If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data”
Section 7604(a) reads:
     ‘If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data.”
_________________
The District Court agreed with respondents’ contentions. Although at the hearing the court seemed to recognize ‘that in any criminal investigation there’s always a probability of civil tax liability,” id., at 61,
it focused its attention on the purpose of Special Agent Olivero:
     “I’ll say now that I heard nothing in Agent Olivero’s testimony to suggest that the thought of a civil investigation ever crossed his mind.

     “Now, unless I find something in the in camera inspection [of the IRS case file] that gives more support to the Government position than the Agent’s testimony did, it would be my conclusion that he
was at all times involved in a criminal investigation, at least in his own mind.” 5. Id., at 62.
In its written memorandum, the District Court noted that Donaldson permitted the use of an IRS summons issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. Relying on dictum in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964), however, the court said that it was an improper use of the summons “to serve it solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.” 76-1 U.S.T.C., at 84,072, 37 A.F.T. R.2d, at 76-1240. If, at the time of its issuance, the summons served this proscribed purpose, the court concluded, the
absence of a formal criminal recommendation was irrelevant, the summons was not issued in good faith, and enforcement was precluded. The court then held:
     “It is apparent from the evidence that Special Agent John F. Olivero in his investigative activities had focused upon the possible criminal activities of John Gattusu, and was conducting his investigation solely for the purpose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct by Mr. Gattuso.” Id., at 84,073, 37 A.F.T.R.2d, at 76 1240.
    The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 554 F.2d 302 (1977). It concluded that the District Court correctly had included the issue of criminal purpose within the good-faith inquiry:
     “[T]he use of an administrative summons solely for criminal purposes is a quintessential example of bad faith.
   .                   .                    .                     .                  .                 .                 .

“We note that the district court formulated its factual finding by use of the expression ‘sole criminal purpose’ rather than by a label such as ‘bad faith.’ We find no basis for reversible error in that verbal formulation. The district court grasped the vital core of Donaldson and rendered its factual finding consistently therewith.” Id., at 309.

The Court of Appeals further decided that the District Court had reached a factual, rather than a legal, conclusion when it found the summonses to have been issued solely for a criminal prosecution. Id., at
305. Appellate review, accordingly, was limited to application of the clearly erroneous standard. Id., at 306. Although the Court of Appeals noted that Olivero had testified about the existence of a civil purpose for the investigation, the court said that “the record establishes that the district court did not believe him.” Id., at 309. The appellate court could not reverse the trial court’s judgment, it said, because it was “not left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake had been made.”
Id., at 306.
     Because of the importance of the issue in the enforcement of the internal revenue laws, and because of conflict among the courts of appeals concerning the scope of IRS summons authority under § 7602, 6 we granted certiorari. —U.S. —, 98 S.Ct. 632, 54 L.Ed.2d 489 (1977).

                                                                    II

In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 91 S.Ct. 534, 27 LEd.2d 580 (1971), an IRS special agent issued summonses to a taxpayer’s putative former employer and its accountant for the production of the employer’s records of the taxpayer’s employment and compensation. When the records were not forthcoming, the IRS petitioned for the enforcement of the summonses. The taxpayer intervened and eventually appealed the enforcement order. This Court addressed the taxpayer’s contention
that the summonses were unenforceable because they were issued in aid of an investigation that could have resulted in a criminal charge against the taxpayer. His argument there, see Id., at 532, 91 S.Ct., at 543, was based on the’ following dictum in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84 S.Ct.
508, 513, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964):

“[T]he witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772 773 ....."

In the light of the citation to Boren” the Court in Donaldson concluded that the dictum referred and was applicable “to the situation of a pending criminal charge or, at most, of an investigation solely for criminal purposes.” 400 U.S., at 533, 91 S.Ct., at 544.
Discerning the meaning of the brief Reisman dictum, however, did not resolve for the Court the question posed by Donaldson. The validity of the summonses depended ultimately on whether they were among those authorized by Congress. 8    Having reviewed the statutory scheme, 400 U.S., at
523-525, 91 S.Ct., at 538 -540, the Court concluded that Congress had authorized the use of summonses in investigating potentially criminal conduct. The statutory history, particularly the use of summonses under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 9. supported this conclusion, as did consistent
IRS practice and decisions concerning effective enforcement of other comparable federal statutes.10 The Court saw no reason to force the Service to choose either to forgo the use of congressionally authorized summonses or to abandon the option of recommending criminal prosecutions to the Department of Justice.11’ As long as the summonses were issued in good-faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes, and prior to any recommendation to the Department for prosecution, they were enforceable. 400 U.S., at 536, 91 S.Ct., at 545.

                                                                     III

    The present case requires us to examine the limits of the good-faith use of an Internal Revenue summons issued under § 7602. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Donaldson does not control the facts now before us. There, the taxpayer had argued that the mere potentiality of criminal prosecution should have. precluded enforcement of the summons. 400 U.S., at 532, 91 S.Ct., at 543. Here, on the other hand, the District Court found that Special Agent Olivero was investigating Gattuso “solely for the purpose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct.” 76-1 U.S.T.C., at 84,073, 37 A.F.
T.R.2d, at 76-1240. The question-then becomes whether this finding necessarily leads to the conclusion that the summonses were not issued in good-faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602.

                                                                      A

     [1] The Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7801 and 7802. Congress, by § 7601(a), has required the Secretary to canvass revenue districts to “inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax.” With regard to suspected fraud, these duties encompass enforcement of both civil and criminal statutes. The willful submission of a false or fraudulent tax return may subject a taxpayer not only to criminal penalties under § 7206 and 7207 of the Code, but, as well, to a civil penalty, under § 6653(b), of 50% of the underpayment. And § 6659(a) provides that the civil penalty shall be considered as part of the tax
liability of the taxpayer. Hence, when § 7602 permits the use of a summons “[f]or the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, . - determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or collecting any such liability, it necessarily permits the use of the summons for examination of suspected tax fraud anti for the calculation of the 50% civil penalty. In Donaldson, 400 U.S., at
535, 91 S.Ct., at 544, we clearly noted that § 7602 drew no distinction between the civil and the criminal aspects; that it “contains no restriction”; that the corresponding regulations were “positive’; and that there was no significance, “for civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the point of a special agent’s appearance. The Court then upheld the use of the summonses even though fraudulent conduct carried the potential of criminal liability. The Court repeated this emphasis in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 326, 93 S.Ct. 611, 614, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973):
     “It is now undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602, to issue an Internal Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with civil and possible criminal consequences.

     This result is inevitable because Congress has created a law enforcement system in which criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined. When an investigation examines the possibility of criminal misconduct, it also necessarily inquires about the appropriateness of assessing the 50% civil tax penalty.’12

     [2]    The legislative history of the Code supports the conclusion that Congress intended to design a system with interrelated criminal anti civil elements. Section 7602 derives assertedly without change in meaning,’13 from corresponding and similar provisions in § 3614, 3615, and 3654 of the 1939 Code. By § 3614 (a) the Commissioner received the summons authority “for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return or for the purpose of making a return where none has been made.” Section
3615(b)(3) authorized the issuance of a summons “[w]henever any person who is required to deliver a monthly or other return of objects subject to tax delivers any return which, in the opinion of the collector, is erroneous, false, or fraudulent, or contains any under valuation or understatement.”
Section 3654(a) stated the powers and duties of the collector:

      “Every collector within his collection district shall see that all laws and regulations relating to the collection of internal revenue taxes are faithfully executed and complied with, and shall aid in the prevention, detection, and punishment of any frauds in relation thereto. For such purposes, he shall have power to examine all persons, books, papers, accounts, and premises..... and to summon any
person to produce books papers.....and to compel compliance with such summons in the same manner as provided in section 3615.”
     Under § 3616 punishment for any fraud included both fine arid imprisonment. The 1939 Code, therefore, contemplated the use of the summons in an investigation involving suspected criminal conduct as well as behavior that could have been disciplined with a civil penalty.’14

notes----------------------------------

5. The District Court was aware of and recognized the Government’s contention that the individual agent’s motive in the investigation was not dispositive:
     ‘The COURT: ... (U)nder your theory any criminal investigation would not really be one until they closed it because there was always a possibility of a civil liability.
            .                        .                             .                                      .                         .
     “If that’s the law, you’re in trouble, Mr. Cushner [counsel for respondents].

     “I think it boils down to an issue of law so its the cases really that I’m interested in plus any further clues I may find in the camera inspection of the investigative file.” App. 61-62.
     The Court agreed to inspect the IRS investigative file in camera after it refused to permit respondents to inspect the file. Id., at 50-51, 61- 62.

6. Compare United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1350—1351 (CA9 1977); United
States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (CA9 1975); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 374
375 (CA3 1975); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460 (CA6 1973); United States v.
Wall Corp., 154 U.S.App.D.C. 309, 311. 475
F.2d 893. 895 (1972); and United States v Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1210 (CAIO 1972); with United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.. 572 F.2d 36, 43 (CA2 1978); and United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117, 119 (CA8 1971), regarding the conflict about whether the recommendation for criminal prosecution is dispositive of the so-called criminal purpose issue.
     Compare United States v. Hodge and Zweig,- 548 F.2d, at 1351; and United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d, at 1210, with United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 625 (CA3 1975), regarding the conflict about whether the criminal recommendation from the IRS to the Department of
Justice or the recommendation from the special agent to his superiors is important in the enforcement inquiry.

7. In Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d, at 772—773, the Ninth Circuit distinguished United States v.
O’Connor, 118 F.Supp. 248 (Mass.l953), which involved an investigation of a taxpayer already
under indictment.

8. The Court had concluded earlier that the summoning of the employers and the accountant’s records for an investigation of the taxpayer did not violate the constitutional rights of any of them. 400 U.S., at 522, 91 S.Ct., at 538.

9. See § 3614, 3615, 3616, and 3654 of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 438-440, 446

10. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. I, II, 90 SCt. 763, 769, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970) (Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act enforcement), citing Standard Sanitary Mfg Co. v. United

11. See Part III-B and n. 15, infra. 

States,  226 U.S. 20, 5l—52, 33 S.Ct. 9, 15—16, 57 LEd. 107 (1912) (Sherman Act enforcement

12. The interrelated nature of the civil and criminal investigative functions is further demonstrated by the organization and functioning of the Internal Revenue Service. Pursuant to 26 CFR § 601.107 (1977), each revenue district has an Intelligence Division, ‘whose mission is to encourage and achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary compliance with the internal revenue laws.” This purpose is implemented by “the investigation of possible criminal violations of such laws and the recommendation (when warranted) of prosecution and/or assertion of the 50 percent ad Val Orem addition to the tax.” Ibid. See generally Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions § 1113.- 563, 1114.8, and 1118.6. 39 Fed.Reg. 11572,
11581, 11601, and 11607 (1974).
     In its Manual for employees, the IRS instructs that the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Division includes all civil penalties except those related to the estimated income tax. Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 4500, 4561 (1976). The Manual adds:
      “Intelligence features are those activities of developing and presenting admissible evidence required to prove criminal violations and the advalorem penalties for civil fraud, negligence and delinquency (except those concerning tax estimations) for all years involved in cases jointly investigated to completion.” Id., at ‘4565.31(4) (1976).
     The Manual also Contains detailed instructions for coordination between special agents and revenue agents during investigations of tax fraud. E. g., Ed., at 4563.431 (1978), and at 4565.22, 4565.32, 4565.41-4565.44 (1976).
     Statistics for the fiscal year 1976 show that the Intelligence Division has a substantially greater involvement with civil fraud than with criminal fraud. Of 8,797 full-scale tax fraud investigations in that year, Only 2,037 resulted in recommendations for prosecution.  The 6,760 cases not recommended involved approximately $11 million in deficiencies and penalties. See 1976 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 33, 61, 152.

13. See H.R.Rep.No.l337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A436 (1954); S.Rep.No.l622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., 617 (1954), ti.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1954, p. 4025.

14. Internal Revenue officials received similar summons authority in revenue acts prior to the
1939 Code. See, e. g., Revenue Act of 1918, § 1305, 40 Stat. 1142; tariff Act of Oct. 3,
1913, § II’ I, 38 Stat. 178 179; Act of June 30, 1864, § 14, 13 Stat. 226.
The interrelated nature of fraud investigations thus was apparent as early as 1864. Section 14 of the 1864 Act permitted the issuance of a summons to investigate a suspected fraudulent return, It also prescribed a 100% increase in valuation as a civil penalty for falsehood. Section 15 established the criminal penalties for such conduct. Four years later, when Congress created the position of district supervisor, that official received similar summons authority. Act of July 20, 1868, § 49, 15 Stat. 144 145; see Cong.Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess..3450 (1868). The federal courts enforced these
summonses when they were issued in good faith and in compliance with instructions from the commissioner. See In re Meador, 16 F Cas 1294, 1296 (ND Ga.1869); Stanwood v. Green,
22 F.Cas. 1077, 1079 (ND Miss.l870) (“it being understood that this right upon the part of the
supervisor extends only to such books and papers as relate to their banking operations, and are connected with the Internal Revenue of the United States.